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Despite being internationally recognised as an economic powerhouse of the 
African continent, South Africa struggles to overcome certain socio-economic 
problems, which predominantly stem from the inequalities within its society.  One 
of the most important areas of prevailing concern is high unemployment, 
particularly amongst the youth segment of the population. Approximately 42% of 
South Africans under the age of 30 are unemployed, a fate shared by less than 17% 
of those above 30 years of age. 
The South African government appropriately sought to ensure a better 
future for all its citizens by ‘creating’, or facilitating the creation, of more jobs.  As 
part of its ‘program of action’, one of the initial steps was to enact the Employment 
Tax Incentive Act, No. 26 of 2013 (‘ETIA’). 
The following extract is from the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013: 
“High youth unemployment means young people are not gaining the skills 
or experience needed to drive the economy forward.  (…) 
In response to the high rate of youth unemployment, government wishes to 
implement an incentive mainly aimed at encouraging employers to hire young 
and less experienced work seekers, as stated in the National Development Plan. 
The incentive is one among many that will fall under the umbrella of 
government's youth employment strategy, the National Youth Accord, which 
outlines a program of action to address youth unemployment.” 
The primary aim of this study is to conduct a detailed analysis of the ETIA 
in order to ultimately evaluate its merits, i.e. by expressing an opinion on whether 
or not it is assisting in combatting youth unemployment.  The analysis compares 
similar types of legislation that have been implemented, both successfully and 
unsuccessfully, in other countries in attempts to address similar unemployment 
issues.  This paper reflects events, legislation and published literature as at 1 
December 2015.  
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Since being ‘reborn’ as a democratic society in 1994, the South African 
political landscape has undergone a complete metamorphosis.  In certain respects, 
the changes our country has undergone have been for the better and in others it 
has been for the worse.  
The purpose of this research paper is not to analyse the political landscape 
of South Africa, as this would be an insurmountable task in a paper of this length.  
Furthermore, chances are slim that such an undertaking will produce anything 
different from what has been concluded in many political research papers in the 
past.  My idea with this research paper, and what I will hopefully achieve 
successfully, is to provide insight into one of the newest taxation incentives 
enacted by the South African legislature, being Act No. 26 of 2013: The 
Employment Tax Incentive Act, 2013 (‘ETIA’).  The ratio for this new Act was to 
address a long-standing issue in South Africa, i.e. youth unemployment. 
  Many an observer would recognise and agree that unemployment (and 
especially youth unemployment) constitutes a serious problem in South Africa and 
serves as one of the primary contributors to several other social and economic 
problems our country is currently plagued with - the high level of crime being an 
obvious frontrunner in this regard.  According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), South Africa is the OECD member 
country with the highest percentage of ‘youth not in employment or in education 
and training’ as at Q1 2013.1  In its Economic Survey on South Africa (2013)2, the 
OECD notes as follows: 
“Despite considerable success on many economic and social policy fronts 
over the past 19 years, South Africa faces a number of long-standing economic 
1 OECD (2013). Action-plan for youth – giving youth a better start (June 2013) Available at: 
(http://www.oecd.org/youth.htm). 
2 OECD (2013). Economic Surveys: South Africa @ OECD 2013. Available at: 
(http://www.oecd.org/general/economic%20survey%20south%20africa), at page 11.  
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problems that still reflect at least in part the long-lasting and harmful legacy of 
apartheid. One is a lack of economic dynamism […].  Above all, employment 
remains too low and unemployment excessively high, which exacerbates a range 
of social problems and tensions.” 
Unemployment among the youth of South Africa is an acute problem that 
requires urgent address.  Approximately 42% of young people under the age of 30 
are unemployed compared to less than 17% of adults over 30; the former category 
being the group from which South Africa’s future leaders ought to emerge.3  Our 
government has recognised this problem and the fact that it needs to be addressed 
immediately and urgently.  
1.2 Objectives and approach 
In his State of the Nation address on 11 February 2010, President Jacob 
Gedleyihlekisa Zuma (‘President Zuma’) said: 
“The most urgent focus of policy change must be interventions to create 
jobs for young people.  Unemployment rates for young people are substantially 
higher than the average.  Proposals will be tabled to subsidise the cost of hiring 
younger workers, to encourage firms to take on inexperienced staff.”4 
The above passage was the first of several public statements in the build-up 
to the eventual enactment of the ETIA on the 18th of December 2013.5  The ETIA 
officially came into effect on 1 January 20146 and it provides for an employment 
tax incentive in the form of an amount by which employees’ tax may be reduced.7  
The government’s aim with the incentive is to reduce unemployment, especially in 
relation to young work seekers, by encouraging employers to hire young and less 
3 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 5. Available at: 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/Confronting%20youth%20unemployment
%20-%20Policy%20options.pdf) 
4 As issued by the Presidency on: (http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=7753&lid=1)  
5 Government Gazette No. 37185 (Volume 582) 
6 Section 14(2) of the ETIA stipulates that sections 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12 and 13 came into operation on 1 
January 2014. 
7 Cf. the introduction to the Preamble of the ETIA. 
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experienced work seekers, confirming its undertaking in the National 
Development Plan.8  
In the preamble to ETIA the following considerations are given as 
motivation for its enactment: 
“SINCE the unemployment rate in the Republic is of concern to 
government; 
AND SINCE government recognizes the need to share the costs of 
expanding job opportunities within the private sector; 
AND SINCE government wishes to support employment growth by 
focusing on labour market activation, especially in relation to young work 
seekers; 
AND SINCE government is desirous of instituting an employment tax 
incentive […]”. 
In this research paper, I intend to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 
the ETIA and express an opinion (and hopefully an insightful one) on whether it 
will adequately assist to address these youth unemployment issues that have been 
identified.  My intention is to analyse the plain language of the ETIA and 
determine whether what is written in the text will in fact provide an adequate 
measure to address youth unemployment.  This is done in the context of the South 
African socio-economic landscape, coupled with a limited discussion of similar tax 
incentives (or subsidies) enacted in other countries. 
1.3 Methodology 
During the course of my research, I have made use of several resources 
issued by our government, also of opinions and critiques from academics and 
experts as well as of international resources relating to the subject of this study.  
All resources are listed in footnotes as and when they are used and a 
8 The Explanatory Memorandum on the Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013 (‘EM’) at page 2. 
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comprehensive list is also included in the bibliography at the end of this research 
paper. 
The structure of this research paper is as follows: 
Firstly, I provide a brief historical overview (in Chapter 2) of the use of 
taxation legislation and more specifically employment subsidies to counter socio-
economic problems.  The focus is on measures or subsidies that have been used by 
governments across the world to specifically counter youth unemployment, i.e. 
targeted subsidies9.  I will not evaluate any legislation in detail in this chapter as 
such an analysis is conducted in the latter parts of this research paper.  My 
intention was to paint an initial picture for the reader as regards taxation measures 
that have been used in the past by governments in selected jurisdictions to, for 
instance, incentivise employers to hire young work seekers.   
In Chapter 3, I provide some of the latest data and statistics relating to 
youth unemployment levels in South Africa.  Once again, the objective is not to 
provide extensive details, but to give the reader an impression of the extent of the 
actual problem that requires to be addressed and also to underline the fact that the 
persistently high rate of unemployment is indeed one of the most pressing socio-
economic challenges that the South African government faces.10 
Thirdly, in Chapter 4, I comprehensively analyse the legal framework of the 
new counter-youth-unemployment measure in South Africa - the ETIA.  The 
intention was to conduct a clause-by-clause analysis of the ETIA (and supporting 
materials such as the EM) in its current form and ultimately to evaluate whether 
the plain language of the ETIA will give effect to its intended purpose, being ‘to 
support employment growth, especially in relation to young work seekers’11 .  
Despite the fact that the ETIA was relatively recently enacted, it has received wide-
ranging publicity (predominantly negative) during the course of the build-up to its 
promulgation in December 2013.  Many stakeholders and commentators agree 
9 “The objective of a targeted subsidy is to improve the employment prospects and opportunities for a 
particular group.  It does this by reducing the costs of employing the targeted group relative to other groups, 
making them more attractive to hire” - Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa 
(Discussion paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 28. 
10 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 9. 
11 Cf. the preamble to the ETIA.  
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that, whilst the ETIA shows some intention on the government’s part to address 
youth unemployment, it fails to tackle underlying, core issues, such as a struggling 
economy and poor basic education provision.12  Some of the major concerns raised 
by academics, journalists, politicians and labour unions with regard to the ETIA 
are therefore brought to the fore in the latter parts of Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5, and in furtherance of the background provided in Chapter 2, I 
conduct a detailed analysis of similar legislation, i.e. so-called targeted subsidies 
and other counter-unemployment measures enacted in certain other countries.  
The intention was to enable a comparative study with the ETIA by means of such 
an analysis.  An explanation as to why certain countries were selected for the 
comparison with the ETIA will also be provided.  Ultimately, the purpose of this 
analysis is to highlight the reasons for the successes and failures in other countries 
of such legislative measures; also to put forward suggestions or proposals 
regarding the ETIA in its current form and to express my view on its merits and 
shortcomings in the light of such comparisons.   
Concluding remarks are made in Chapter 6. 
1.4 Limitations and scope 
The intention of this paper was to analyse the ETIA, to provide suggestions 
as to where the problem areas may lie and also how the current legislation could be 
improved.  Where suggestions or recommendations are offered, they are offered as 
provisional conclusions, and not as proposals on how primary changes to the text 
of the ETIA should be enacted per se.   
This research paper focuses on the proposed effectiveness of the ETIA 
within the South African socio-economic landscape and specifically on whether the 
legislative changes will achieve the goal of countering youth unemployment.  No 
other factors are considered when comments or suggestions are made and the 
author acknowledges that suggestions may not always be practicable, due to other 
factors not considered in the research.  These  limitations on the scope of this 
study may represent potential areas for future research. 
12 Equal Education (2013). Our ten concerns about the Employment Tax Incentive Act. (19 December 2013) 
Available at: (http://equaleducation.org.za/article/2013-12-19-10-concerns-about-the -employment-tax-
incentive-act-which-introduces-a-youth-wagesubsidy-for-business)       
7
All references to the ETIA in this study refer to the Employment Incentive 
Act, No. 26 of 2013 and incorporate any changes brought about by the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act, No. 43 of 2014.  
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Chapter 2 
The use of wage subsidies to combat youth unemployment 
2.1  Introduction 
Before venturing into the details of the ETIA, I deem it necessary to give the 
reader some insight into how ‘tax incentives’13 have been used by governments of 
certain countries in the past to assist in achieving certain socio-economic goals, for 
example combatting youth unemployment.  Humans generally react to incentives - 
a sales person, for instance, would be willing to work harder and sacrifice more of 
his or her personal time if incentivised by an employer, i.e. by way of a commission 
or bonus.  On the same premise, consumers will be more likely to spend money 
when incentivised by substantial discounts offered by retailers and, so too, would 
companies and corporations be more likely and willing to satisfy certain specified 
criteria, for instance hiring more employees defined by certain characteristics such 
as age or socio-economic background, if a financial incentive is provided.  
In South Africa, as in most countries with progressive, economically driven 
tax systems, a wide variety of tax incentives are implemented by legislatures and 
made available to taxpayers to stimulate aspects of the economy that require 
addressing at any point in time.  As an example, the Research and Development 
incentive in section 11D of the ITA provides accelerated allowances to companies, 
which foster research into and the development of certain scientific and innovative 
technologies.  The idea behind section 11D is to enhance South Africa’s global 
competitiveness in the science and technology fields.  This is done by encouraging 
participants (i.e. companies and corporates normally at the forefront of their 
particular field or business) to participate in certain activities – the benefits for the 
participants lying, among others, in enhanced in-house technologies and processes 
as well as being eligible for accelerated allowances for expenditure incurred on 
such investments, effectively lessening the tax burden of such institutions over the 
short term.  Similarly, incentives are available under provisions that relate to 
Special Economic Zones14 or Industrial Development Zones15, giving added tax 
13 ‘A tax incentive is an aspect of a country’s tax code designed to incentivise, or encourage a particular 
economic activity’ – (http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_incentive). 
14 See sections 12R and 12S of the ITA. 
15 See section 12I of the ITA. 
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benefits to companies if they conduct their trade in certain zoned areas of South 
Africa.  These incentives, however, are not the focus of this research paper and will 
not be discussed any further. 
Of more relevance to the subject matter of this paper is the fact that the 
granting of employment subsidies (such as the employment tax incentive intended 
under the ETIA) has been a recurring feature of labour market - and tax policies in 
many countries over recent decades.  In a discussion document issued by the South 
African National Treasury during the lead-up to the enactment of the ETIA16, it 
was noted as follows: 
“The majority of OECD countries have some form of job subsidy, 
recruitment incentive or policies to reduce non-wage labour costs.  France, 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom have all implemented new measures in 
the last two years.  Several middle-income countries have also adopted wage 
subsidies as a result of rising unemployment during the global economic crisis 
including Chile, Korea, the Slovak Republic and Turkey.  In the cases of Chile and 
Turkey, these have been specifcally targetted towards younger workers”. 
Clearly, the South African legislature was not taking action without 
precedent when it was decided to enact the ETIA; in fact, it had many case studies 
and examples from which guidelines could be drawn during the modelling and 
drafting of the ETIA in the form of a practical and effective counter-unemployment 
legislative measure. 
2.2  Wage subsidies: purpose and general approach 
Wage or employment subsidies are incentives that aim to accelerate job 
creation and increase levels of employment (thus combatting unemployment) and 
have been used in both developed and developing countries.17  In a recent paper by 
16 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 23 and 24. 
17 Burns J, Edwards L & Pauw K (2010). Wage Subsidies to Combat Unemployment and Poverty: Assessing 
South Africa’s Options on behalf of the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. Page 1 - 





Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010)18, wage subsidies are categorised as follows: 
“Wage subsidies can either be classified as worker-side or firm-side 
programs.   Worker-side wage subsidy schemes grant workers a subsidy upon 
sucessfully obtaining employment and the primary objective is to increase 
participation in the labour market.  Examples of these policies include the 
Working Families Tax Credit program in the United Kingdom and the Self-
Sufficiency Program in Canada which targets parents with children (Smith 
2006).  The appropriateness of worker-side wage subsidies in South Africa and 
other developing is questionable, the constraint being that unemployed 
individuals are simply unable to find employment given a lack of demand. (…) 
The alternative approach is to offer firm-side subsidies, which are granted 
to firms as an incentive to employ more workers.  This policy is appropriate 
when labour is underutilised or unemployed.  Given South Africa’s high 
unemployment rate,  firm-side subsidies would appear to be most appropriate.” 
Firm-side (or employer-side) wage subsidies operate in a straightforward 
way: the subsidy granted by the incentivisor (normally the government or 
legislature) lowers the cost of employing people for the incentivised employers, 
whilst not affecting the actual salary that the employee takes home - thus enabling 
companies to increase employment and output.19  These subsidies can be applied 
to employees in general (a ‘general subsidy’), to net changes in employment (an 
‘incremental subsidy’), to certain groups of employees (a ‘targeted subsidy’) or to 
gross flows into employment arising from new hirees or layoffs.   The most 
commonly used is the targeted recruitment or hiring subsidy, which compensates 
employers by way of a subsidy for newly hired workers with certain prescribed 
characteristics.20 
In developing countries, where a labour market failure is normally 
associated with high unemployment, an employer-side subsidy that promotes an 
increased demand for labour is normally more appropriate.21   Targeted subsidies 
                                                            
18  Ibid 17 at page 2. 
19 Ibid 17 at page 2. 
20 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 28. 
21 Ibid 17 at page 2. 
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form a central part of labour market policies in many countries where the the costs 
of labour to an employer are lowered or where the wages workers receive are 
increased, thereby stimulating both job creation and higher employment.  By 
assisting the unemployed in finding formal, well-regulated employment, 
employment subsidies also contribute toward the creation of decent jobs.22 
It will become more apparent in Chapter 4 that the subsidy envisaged under 
the ETIA indeed constitutes an employer side wage subsidy, targeting a certain 
group of prospective employees; hence a discussion of this type of subsidy is the 
aim of the rest of this chapter. 
2.3 Examples of wage subsidies used in other countries 
Several examples of employer-side, targetted subsidising similar to the 
employment incentive under the ETIA have previously been implemented in a 
number of countries.  In North America, the Employment Tax Credit Program in 
Canada (1978) targeted people who had been unemployed for 8 weeks or more, 
obliging employers to employ such workers for more than three months in a full 
time job in order to qualify for the subsidy.   The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit in the 
United States, which was replaced by the Work Opportunities Tax Credit in 1994, 
targetted economically disadvantaged youths, poor veterans from the war in 
Vietnam, handicapped individuals and social assistance recipients.  Neither of 
these programs was very successful.23 
Examples of employer-side wage subsidies from Europe, Asia and South America 
include24 : 
a) The United Kingdom (The New Deal, April 1998): As a result of a high
incidence of youth unemployment in the United Kingdom, the government
implemented this employer-based subsidy to assist young people between
the ages of 18 and 24 years old.  It was considered to be a comprehensive
intervention by the British government, as it provided several gateways for
22  National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 28. 
23 Ibid 17 at page 5. 
24 Examples from South America and Asia are more comparable to those from South Africa, as these are also 
developing or emerging market countries that will often face challenges similar to those from South Africa. 
(Ibid 17) 
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participants to enter the labour market.25  By January 1999, a study by Bell, 
Blundell and van Reenen26 revealed that, ten months after implementation 
of this subsidy, 40% of the youths who had passed through the so-called 
“gateway”27 phase had moved to unsubsidised employment and 30% into 
full time education and training. 
b) Poland (Intervention Works Programme, mid 1990s):  This intervention by
the Polish government entailed a subsidy which paid the wage and social
insurance costs of all unemployed persons and was implemented following
a sharp rise in general unemployment in that country.  The programme also
provided for other incentives, such as additional subsidies to employers if
they retained qualifying workers for a period of six months after the initial
subsidy period.28  A subsequent study by O’Leary29 found a positive effect
on employment levels, but a negative effect on the average earnings of
people younger than 30.
c) Singapore (Wage Credit Scheme, 2013):  Under this scheme, the
Singaporean government proposed to co-fund 40% of wage increases given
to ‘qualifying employees’30 who earned less than SGD4,000 (Singapore
Dollars) per year.  Even though not solely implemented as a mechanism to
combat unemployment, it allows employers to free up resources to invest in
productivity and to share gains from increased productivity with
employees.31   The need for this intervention arose because of an influx of
high-earning foreign expatriates, which necessitated an increase in wages of
25 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 26. 
26 Bell, B., R. Blundell and J. van Reenen (1999). Getting the Unemployed back to work: The Role of 
targeted wage subsidies, Institute for Fiscal Studies Working paper No. 99/12. 
27 As part of the New Deal for Youth Employment in the UK, a four-month gateway period was allowed 
every unemployed youth to receive assistance in searching for a job opportunity by a personal job assistance 
councellor. 
28 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011)at page 31. 
29 O’Leary, C.J., (1998).  Evaluating the effectiveness of active labour programmes in Poland, technical 
report No 98-012 (Upjohn Institute, Michigan, USA). 
30 To qualify, an employee has to be a Singaporean citizen earning a gross monthly wage of less than 
SGD4,000 and be on the employer’s payroll for three months before any qualifying year and received CPF 
contributions during such time. 




local employees and which in turn put local businesses in financial 
distress.32 
d) Chile (Joven, 1991): A firm-side training-linked subsidy was introduced in 
1991 with the aim to encourage employers to hire and train unemployed 
youths (between ages 15 and 24), thereby receiving a subsidy to cover 
training costs, whilst the participating youths received transportation 
subsidies.33 
e) Argentina (Proyecto Joven, 1997/’98):  This program provided a 6-month 
training subsidy to participating employers on condition that the thus 
trained employees would be retained for 6 months thereafter.  Even though 
it had to be properly evaluated and updated by way of a further subsidy, i.e. 
the ‘Proempleo Experiment’, this subsidy led to an employment increase of 
6% over 18 months within the target group.34   
South Africa has implemented a learnership allowance in the past, 
i.e. a training-linked wage subsidy, through section 12H of the ITA.  This is a 
modern version of traditional apprenticeships and the response to the idea 
has been positive among most employers in South Africa.  The complexity of 
implementing and administering such learnerships has been an aspect 
receiving criticism, however, as has been the fact that subsidy values are 
normally inadequate to cover compliance costs, while the values are 
generally not very flexible in nature, either.35 
f) Colombia (First Job Law, 2010):  On 29 December 2010, the Colombian 
Congress issued the Formalisation and Creation of Jobs Act, more 
commonly known as the Law of First Employment.36    This piece of 
legislation consists of four parts, all of which are designed to bring about 
increased formal employment throughout Colombia, by reducing the 
statutory income tax rate for small companies, reducing payroll fees for 
                                                            
32 Mukherjee, A (2013). Wage Subsidy could blunt Singapore’s edge (26 February 2013). Available at: 
(http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingnews/2013/02/26/wage-subsidy-could-blunt-singapores-edge/) 
33 Ibid 17 at page 5. 
34 Ibid 17 at page 5.   
35 Ibid 17 at page 5. 
36 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). Tax and Legal News Alert (January 2011) - at page 3 and News Alert by 
Prieto and Carrizosa Law Firm. 
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small companies and, more particularly, by providing a tax credit on payroll 
fees paid.  One of the focus areas is targeted at stimulating first employment 
for people under the age of 28, specifically in the agricultural sector.37  
Effectively, this payroll incentive to stimulate first employment, operated by 
way of a tax credit granted to employers for hiring employees under the age 
of 28; women over 40 years old, workers earning less than USD 420 per 
month or employees in displacement or with a disability.38  Even though its 
operation was slightly different to that of the incentive under the ETIA 
employers also obtained access to a tax benefit by hiring employees that met 
the above requirements. 
2.4 Successes and failures 
It is evident from the above that the use of wage subsidies is not an 
uncommon practice among governments.  Several of them have done so with great 
success whilst others have been less successful.  Various advisers to government 
have endorsed wage subsidies as a means to address unemployment and, although 
the international experience of wage subsidies tends to be more negative than 
positive, it does not suggest failure for such an incentive or programme in South 
Africa. 
It is not my intention to discuss the potential success of the ETIA in the 
present chapter, as I will do so later in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  The aim in this (the 
second) chapter was to inform the reader of interventions similar to the ETIA 
introduced by other governments.  In Chapter 3, I intend to, very briefly, provide 
insight into the most recent data and statistics on youth unemployment in South 
Africa with the aim to make the reader aware of the extent of the problem that the 
ETIA is intended to address.  A more detailed comparative study of some of the 
targetted wage subsidies mentioned above with the ETIA, is made in Chapter 5. 
37 Colombiabiz (2010). The Proposed “Law of First Employment” – Towards Formalisation, Through 
Incentives, A National Database and Regulatory Reforms. (18 December 2010)  Available at: 
(http://colombiabiz.com/2010/12/18/the-law-of-first-employment-towards-formalization). 
38 Prieto and Carrizosa Law Firm, News Alert (2010). New Law Partially Overhauls Corporate Law 
Foundations and Creates Incentives for New Businesses.  Available at: (www.prietocarrizosa.com/en). 
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Chapter 3 
The current youth unemployment crisis in South Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
As has been illustrated in the preceding chapters, the use of legislation by 
governments to address socio-economic problems is not an uncommon 
occurrence, with taxation being at the forefront of such legislative efforts.   What 
should also become evident to the reader (if it is not apparent already), is that 
South Africa is currently experiencing a youth unemployment crisis and an 
extreme one at that.  In its discussion paper for public comment issued in the lead-
up to the enactment of the ETIA39, National Treasury (‘Treasury’) noted that: 
“South Africa has an acute problem of youth unemployment that requires 
a multi-pronged strategy to raise employment and support inclusion and social 
cohesion”. 
In the EM40, issued with the final Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013, 
Treasury further elaborates: 
“Many South Africans are excluded from economic activity, and as a result 
suffer disproportionately from unemployment, discouragement and economic 
marginalisation.  High youth unemployment means young people are not 
gaining the skills or experience needed to drive the economy forward. (…)  
In response to the high rate of youth unemployment, government wishes to 
implement an incentive mainly aimed at encouraging employers to hire young 
and less experienced work seekers, as stated in the National Development Plan.” 
In a paper published in the lead up to the EU elections in 201441, the 
following was said about the consequences of high youth unemployment: 
39 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 5. 
40 Explanatory Memorandum on the Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 31 October 2013 - at page 1. 
41 Nedeljkovic, V (2014). Consequences of High Youth Unemployment.  27 April 2014.  Available at: 
(www.bridgingeurope.net/consequences-of-high-youth-unemployment.html). 
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“Early unemployment has a negative effect not only on the future 
employability of young people but also their self-esteem, their role in society and 
can represent a serious economic burden on the state and finances. (…) 
Last but not least, high youth unemployment has a negative effect on 
economic growth and productivity.  Having a large share of the young workforce 
unemployed not only leads to reduced productivity and gross domestic product 
(GDP) but also increases economic costs for the state since there is money to be 
paid on social welfare but less taxes coming in.” 
From the passages above, it is apparent that the current youth 
unemployment crisis in our country needs to be addressed urgently to prevent an 
overall collapse of the South African economy.  Our leaders need to act swiftly and 
decisively to preserve the medium- to long-term health of our economy.   
3.2  Purpose and approach  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with some recent and 
verified data and statistics on youth unemployment in South Africa.  The idea is 
not to delve into these statistics too deeply, but rather to paint a basic and general 
picture of the current youth unemployment crisis.  In this way I intend to create a 
basis for the analysis of the ETIA that will follow in the remainder of this paper. 
The idea is to be able to determine the ETIA’s potential to be successful in 
addressing the current youth unemployment problem.   
The statistics I use in the rest of this chapter are limited to what was issued 
and available at the time of writing.  Statistics were obtained from various sources, 
particularly from Statistics South Africa (‘Stats SA’)42 and its Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (‘QLFS’) - a household-based survey conducted on a quarterly basis.  
At the time of writing of this chapter, the latest issue was the Q3:2014, which was 
issued on 30 October 2014.43   Naturally, these figures are subject to change, but it 
42 Stats SA is the national statistical service of South Africa, with the goal of producing timely, accurate, and 
official statistics. Website at: (www.statssa.gov.za) 
43 The QLFS collects data on the labour market activities of individuals aged 15 years and above who live in 





should reflect what it intends to, namely that South Africa is suffering from a youth 
unemployment crisis.  Other sources are referenced as and when they are used. 
3.3  Current statistics and reasons for it 
 According to a Global Risk report issued by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) in 201444, South Africa has the third highest unemployment rate for people 
between the ages of 15 and 24, with only Spain and Greece having higher numbers 
for this age bracket.  It is estimated in this same report that more than 50% of 
young South Africans between the ages of 15 and 24 are unemployed.   The graph 
below, which was included in the document issued by National Treasury in the 
lead up to the enactment of the ETIA45, depicts the ratio of youth to adult 
unemployment against the total youth unemployment rate in the country.  It is 
relatively clear that, in comparison to other countries shown on this graph, 
including several other developing countries, South Africa is far worse off in terms 
of youth unemployment. 
 
Another graph that makes for interesting reading is the one below, also 
from the discussion document issued by Treasury in February 201146.  This shows 
                                                            
44 World Economic Forum (2014). Global Risks 2014 Ninth Edition.  Published on16 January 2014 at page 
33. Available at: (www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf). 
45 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) at page 14. Original Source – International 
Labour Organisation; Key Indicators of the Labour market, 6th edition December 2009. 
46 Source: Statistics SA Quarterly Labour Survey, September 2014. 
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the comparative unemployment percentages of different age groups in South 
Africa, and makes it apparent that South Africans between the ages of 15 and 29 
have at least twice the chance of being unemployed compared to someone over the 
age of 40. 
A further international comparison, depicted below, shows that even though 
South Africa’s overall employment ratio is (to some extent, at least) comparable to 
other emerging markets, the same cannot be said with regard to youth 
employment.  It is clear from the little (red) box in the vertical bar that South 
Africa’s youth employment level is substantially lower than that of other emerging 
markets used in this graph.47 
47 Source: International Labour Organisation (Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 6th Edition) and Stats SA 
QLFS Survey, June 2010. 
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Of more concern from a South African perspective is a statistic that came to 
the fore in an OECD report issued in June 2013. 48  According to this report, South 
Africa has the highest rate of youths ‘not in employment or in education or 
training’ of all OECD member countries.  Not only are more than half of young 
South Africans unemployed, but of those unemployed more than one third is not 
receiving any education or training in order to make them more employable. 
In a statement by the Labour Department in October 2014, Sam Morotoba 
(the Acting Director General for Labour) noted49: 
“With an unemployment rate of 25,5% South Africa is faced with the triple 
challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. (…) 
The survey results recently released by Stats SA reflect an increase of 87 
000 unemployed persons from the first quarter to the second quarter of 2014.  
These results further show that out of the 8.3 million unemployed, 4.4 million is 
the youth between 15 and 34 years of age.” 
Another report published by the youth desk in the South African Presidency 
notes that South Africa alone accounts for 1,9% of global youth employment (1.38 
million out of a total of 73 million in total globally).  Conversely, South Africa only 
accounts for 0,77% of the total global population – which means that, currently, 
South Africa is taking up more than double of what might be termed its ‘fair share’ 
of global youth unemployment.50 
In general, and compared to statistics published in Q3:2013 by Stats SA, 
overall employment numbers increased slightly (by 81 000 to be exact) during the 
period July to September 2014.  This is mainly due to expansion in the formal and 
informal sectors, which grew in Q3:2014. 51   The table below compares the 
unemployment percentages and labour force participation rates per age group 
from Q3:2012 up to Q3:2014.  Once again, the findings emphasise that the core of 
South Africa’s current unemployment issues lies with the fact that the younger 
48 OECD (2013. Action-plan for youth – Giving youth a better start (June 2013).  Available at: 
(http://www.oecd.org/youth.htm) at page 1. 
49 Available at: (www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-statement/2014). 
50 Berman, JK (2015). There is no disguising SA’s youth unemployment problem (26 January 2015) in 
Business Day.  Available at: (www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/01/26) 




portion of the population is finding it hard to enter the job market, with only 
approximately 25% of youths between the ages of 15 and 24 participating in it. 









15 – 64 years    
Unemployment 25,2% 24,5% 25,4% 
Labour force 
participation rates 
56,8% 57,1% 57,1% 
15-24 years    
Unemployment 52,2% 50,3% 51,3% 
Labour force 
participation rates 
25,9% 26,0% 25,1% 
25-34 years    
Unemployment 29,9% 28,9% 31,3% 
Labour force 
participation rates 
73,8% 72,8% 73,6% 
 
3.4  Concluding remarks 
 From the afore-going, it should be unequivocally clear that South Africa is 
suffering from an acute youth unemployment crisis.  What remains to be seen is 
whether the mechanisms government intends to implement, or has already 
implemented, will go any way in combating this problem and, accordingly, in 
rehabilitating this part of the South African economy.  To pose a more specific 
question in this regard: Will government’s move to ‘implement an incentive 
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mainly aimed at encouraging employers to hire young and less experienced work 
seekers (ETIA)’ have the effect it was intended to have? 
An in-depth analysis of the provisions of the ETIA as well as some 
comments on its potential to be successful will follow in the next chapter, after 
which a comparative study of the ETIA and other, similar, firm-side wage subsidies 
and other counter-unemployment measures will be conducted in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 
The Employment Tax Incentive Act, No. 26 of 2013 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1 General 
In President Zuma’s 2010 State of the Nation Address he made reference to 
an urgent need for ‘a policy intervention to create more jobs for young people’ 
(see paragraph 1.2).52  As one would expect, this led to wide-spread speculation as 
to which approach the Legislature would follow in considering and potentially 
giving effect to this statement made by the President, especially considering the 
challenges that South Africa faced with basic education at the time (and is still 
facing).  
Treasury provided some clarity on President Zuma’s abovementioned 
remark when it issued a discussion document for public comment during February 
2011 (‘the discussion document’)53.  The discussion document outlined several 
different policy alternatives that were available to government as a potential 
solution to ‘persistently high youth-unemployment’ which, in the same document, 
was acknowledged as one of the ‘most pressing socio-economic challenges’ 
government was facing at the time.54  In the discussion document it was noted that 
only 1 in 8 individuals in South Africa under the age of 25 had jobs, as opposed to 
the 40% average in most emerging economies. This group of unemployed youths 
also accounted for approximately 30% of the total unemployment in South Africa 
at the time.55  
The discussion document further alluded to some of the main factors 
contributing to the alarming figures outlined above being, inter alia, a lack of skills 
and experience, low-quality basic education and high minimum wages (these were 
52 As issued by the Presidency on: (http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=7753&lid=1) 
53 National Treasury (2011). Confronting youth unemployment: Policy options for South Africa (Discussion 
paper as issued by the National Treasury in February 2011) available at: 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/Confronting%20youth%20unemployment
%20-%20Policy%20options.pdf) 
54 Ibid 53 at page 9. 
55 Ibid 53 at page 5. 
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also dissected in Chapter 3).56   In the writer’s opinion it seems logical and 
unavoidable that over the long term these factors would culminate in irreparable 
damage to the South African economy if no intervention takes place.  The reason 
for this opinion is that the age group of the South African population ‘under the 
microscope’ of the discussion document would eventually be unable to take charge 
of and drive the country and the economy forward when expected to do so.  
Consequently, an even bigger burden would be placed on social assistance from 
government by way of grants and subsidies to be funded by an ever-decreasing 
number of taxpayers. 
According to the discussion document ‘the magnitude of the youth 
unemployment challenge facing South Africa means it cannot be resolved by a 
single employment policy’.57  Treasury came to the conclusion that, considering 
that no single policy intervention would provide a comprehensive solution to the 
issue at hand, it was rather required to implement a ‘multi-pronged approach’ to 
create a platform for job creation for youths and to facilitate the general alleviation 
of unemployment.  In short, what was required, was ‘a sustained period of 
accelerated and inclusive economic growth and a comprehensive set of short-
term and long term policy reforms’.58  As part of this multi-pronged strategy to 
tackle youth unemployment, Treasury identified the following activities that 
needed to be carried out to address specific youth unemployment issues: 
a) reviewing the legislative environment;
b) improving educational performance and skills development in the schooling
and further education system;
c) improving the public employment services available to the youth to aid
matching of skills, job search, career guidance and counselling, skills
development and job placement;
d) establishing a monitoring system with regular reports on progress; and
56 Ibid 53 at page 5. 
57 Ibid 53 at page 18. 
58 Ibid 53 at page 6. 
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e) conducting a trial of the youth employment subsidy (the subject of this
paper).59
4.1.2   Youth employment subsidy
In the conclusion of the discussion document, Treasury argued that a youth
employment subsidy that leverages other complementary interventions (see 
paragraph 4.1.1) would be most appropriate for South Africa.60  The basis for this 
conclusion was the fact that educational reforms and skills development would 
only have long-term effects, whilst short-term intervention was also required.  By 
leveraging short-term policies such as a wage subsidy with long-term policies such 
as better education and skills training, an ‘overall harnessing effect’ would be 
created.61  
It was further noted that, considering the private sector provided almost 
90% of the jobs for unskilled or semi-skilled employees, government would create 
the necessary short-term pillar for its multi-pronged strategy by engaging the 
private sector in this way to stimulate labour demand.62   By reducing the overall 
relative cost of labour for employers in the private sector by way of a tax reduction, 
government would reduce some of the risk (especially financial risk) for employers 
when hiring young people, thus stimulating the levels of labour demand for this 
specific class of the labour market.  Treasury estimated that approximately 423 
000 new jobs for unemployed, unskilled youths could be created by establishing 
the envisaged youth employment subsidy. 63 
In accordance with mandatory legislative processes and procedures, the 
public were invited to comment on the suggestions made in the discussion 
document.  In his 2013 Budget Speech (on 27 February), the then Finance Minister 
Pravin Gordhan identified ‘an employment incentive through the tax system for 
first-time job seekers’ as one of the main tax proposals for the 2013 / 2014 fiscal 
59 Ibid 53 at page 6. 
60 Ibid 53 at page 42. 
61 Ibid 53 at page 42. 
62 Ibid 53 at page 42. 
63 Ibid 53 at page 42. 
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year.64  The ETIA was eventually gazetted on 18 December 2013 in Government 
Gazette number 37185 with its effective date being 1 January 2014.65 
4.2  Purpose of the ETIA 
The introduction to the ETIA notes as follows: 
“To provide for an employment tax incentive in the form of an amount by 
which employees’ tax may be reduced; to allow for a claim and payment of an 
amount where employees’ tax cannot be reduced; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.”66 
(Also see the excerpt from the preamble to the ETIA under 1.2: Objectives 
and Purpose.) 
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013 
(‘EM’), which was issued together with the final draft version of the Employment 
Tax Incentive Bill, 2013, on 31 October 2014, further elaborates on the legalis 
fundamentum for the enactment of the ETIA: 
“The Draft Employment Tax Incentive Bill gives effect to the 
announcement by the President in his 2010 State of the Nation Address, as well as 
in the 2010 Budget, that government will table proposals to subsidise the cost of 
hiring younger workers.  The draft bill also gives effect to the 2013 Budget. 
Many South Africans are excluded from economic activity, and as a result 
suffer disproportionately from unemployment, discouragement and economic 
marginalisation.  High youth unemployment means young people are not 
gaining the skills or experience needed to drive the economy forward.  This lack 
of skills can easily become a lifelong experience, thereby having long-term 
adverse effects on the economy. 
In South Africa’s labour market, the current lack of skills and experience as 
64 http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf at page 20. 






well as perceptions regarding the restrictiveness of labour regulations, make 
some prospective employers reluctant to hire youth who may lack experience or 
qualifications.  Given that the private sector contributes about 82 per cent of 
GDP, and employs over 70 per cent of those in formal employment outside of 
agriculture, it is critical that in order to have the biggest impact, this involves the 
private sector.  The incentive seeks to do exactly this. 
In response to the high rate of youth unemployment, government wishes to 
implement an incentive mainly aimed at encouraging employers to hire young 
and less experienced work seekers, as stated in the National Development Plan. 
The incentive is one among many that will fall under the umbrella of 
government's youth employment strategy, the National Youth Accord, which 
outlines a program of action to address youth unemployment.”67 (Own emphasis) 
From the above it is clear that the ETIA was enacted by the Legislature with 
the intention to present a short-term solution to address the acute problem that is 
youth unemployment.  This short-term solution forms part of a comprehensive 
and much needed labour policy overhaul which government had recognised as the 
panacea for youth unemployment issues in South Africa.   
The central question that this research paper therefore intends to address is: 
a) whether the ETIA will in fact have any real and significant positive short-
term effects for South Africans (especially the young unemployed) as it is
intended to; or
b) whether it is rather an ill-conceived attempt by government at showing
some initiative to address the acute problem of youth unemployment which
has no real potential to succeed.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will firstly conduct an in-depth analysis
of the most important sections of the ETIA.  I intend to do this with the guidance 
from the EM which provides insight into the intention of the Legislature and its 
interpretation of the provisions of the ETIA.  Thereafter, I will also address some 




commentary and criticism (both positive and negative) from stakeholders and 
industry experts prior and subsequent to the ETIA’s enactment.  In conclusion, I 
will provide some brief personal views on these concerns raised regarding the 
ETIA.  Ultimately, my intention remains to establish whether the provisions of the 
ETIA will give effect to the envisaged purpose of the legislation as outlined above.   
4.3  The ETIA: critical provisions68 
4.3.1 Application and general operation – section 2 
It should be apparent by now that the benefit of the incentive provided by 
the ETIA to ‘eligible employers’ 69  lies in the fact that hiring ‘qualifying 
employees’70 is cheaper than in normal circumstances.  The incentive reduces the 
cost of hiring such employees by way of a cost-sharing mechanism with 
government, while leaving the actual wage that the employee receives unchanged. 
Simply put, provision is made to grant a ‘qualifying employer’ a reduction in the 
pay-as-you-earn (‘PAYE’) employees’ tax payable to SARS in respect of a 
‘qualifying employee’71.   The ETIA came into effect on 1 January 201472, but 
employers are entitled to claim the incentive in respect of any qualifying employee 
employed on or after 1 October 201373. 
The operation of the incentive is confirmed in section 2 of the ETIA itself (as 
read with the explanatory notes thereon in the EM): 
2. Instituting of employment tax incentive
(1) An incentive, called the employment tax incentive, in order to encourage
employment creation is hereby instituted. 
(2) If an employer is eligible to receive the employment tax incentive in respect of a
qualifying employee in respect of a month, that employer may reduce the employees’ tax 
payable by that employer in an amount determined in terms of section 7 or receive 
payment of an amount contemplated in section 10(2), unless section 8 applies. 
68 Any reference to ‘section’ in the rest of this chapter refers to a section of the ETIA, unless specifically 
indicated otherwise. 
69 See definition at 4.3.2 infra 
70 See definition at 4.3.2 infra 
71 EM at page 3 
72 See section 14(2) of the ETIA 
73 See section 6(e) 
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The EM74 (at page 6) provides the following as an example of the operation 
of the ETIA incentive: 
Example (set-off mechanism) 
             In respect of April, Eligible Employer employs 10 employees: One manager and 9 
qualifying employees.  For April, Eligible Employer has an employees’ tax liability towards 
SARS of R20 000 in respect of the manager’s salary (no employees’ tax liability exists in 
respect of the qualifying employees).  The R20 000 is withheld from the manager’s salary 
in the form of employees’ tax.  
Eligible Employer also has an incentive to the value of R5 000 available in respect 
of the qualifying employees. Eligible Employer may deduct the R5 000 incentive from the 
employees' tax payable so that only R15 000 is payable to SARS for April.  It should be 
noted that the incentive does impact the employees’ tax liability but will not affect the 
reconciliation with the individual's tax return upon assessment.  The employees’ tax paid 
to SARS for April should be reflected as R20 000 less the incentive of R5 000, totalling 
R15 000.  
4.3.2  Definitions and interpretation – section 1 (read with the EM) 
a) ‘company’:  A company as referred to in section 1 of the Companies Act,
No. 71 of 2008; and
‘associated person’:  A company is considered as such where two or more 
companies are directly or indirectly managed or controlled by substantially the 
same persons. 
b) ‘employee’: Includes natural persons (but excludes independent
contractors) who work directly for an employer and who receive remuneration
from that selfsame employer.
The aim of the incentive is to assist in the generation of sustainable 
employment opportunities and the mechanism to claim the incentive is in the first 





employees meet both the above requirements, i.e. that they provide services to the 
specific employer and are remunerated by the same employer. 
c) ‘employees’ tax’:  The amount deducted or withheld from remuneration
(loans, wages or salaries) that must be paid over to SARS by virtue of paragraph
2(1) of the Fourth Schedule to the ITA.
d) ‘monthly remuneration’:  Includes, for qualifying employees, if
employed for a full month, the ‘remuneration’ paid or payable for that particular
month and if employed only for part of a month, the amount that would have been
payable if such employee had been employed for the full month. ‘Remuneration’
follows the definition in the Fourth Schedule of the ITA and is wide-ranging in that
it includes fringe benefits and discretionary amounts, such as bonusses.
e) ‘wage’:  means a wage as defined in section 1 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997 (‘BCEA’).  The use of the same definition ensures
alignment with the labour legislation.
4.3.3 Eligible employers – section 3 
The incentive is available to employers that are registered for employees’ tax 
purposes in terms of paragraph 15 of the Fourth Schedule to the ITA75 and is 
specifically aimed at the private sector (see comments in paragraph 4.2.2).  Public 
sector employers, such as municipalities and government departments, are 
specifically excluded from the definition of ‘eligible employers’, but may become 
eligible if specifically so designated by the Minister of Finance by regulation.76 
The intention of the Legislature was further not to make the incentive under 
the ETIA available to employers that do not meet legal obligations towards 
employees, or to employers that structure their affairs to the detriment of 
employees solely for the purpose of maximising their own access to the tax 
incentive. 77   The exclusions dealing with the prevention of the abuse and 
exploitation of the incentive are dealt with in two provisions, being: 
75 Section 3(a) 
76 Section 3(b) 
77 See EM at page 7 
30
a) Displacement of employees – section 3(c)(1) read with section 5
An employer will be deemed to have ‘displaced’ an employee if the 
dismissal of such employee constitutes an automatically unfair dismissal 
under section 187(f) of the Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’)78, 
or if the employer replaces the dismissed employee with an employee who is 
a qualifying employee in respect of which the employer is eligible to receive 
the employment tax incentive.79  The EM recommends a substance over 
form approach when evaluating the replacement of a dismissed employee 
with a qualifying employee.80  If an employer is deemed to have displaced 
an employee a penalty of R30 000 in respect of such employee is payable to 
SARS.81  The employer may also be completely disqualified from utilising 
the incentive by way of notice in the Government Gazette by the Minister of 
Finance.  In deciding whether to disqualify an employer, the Minister of 
Finance must take into account factors such as the number of employees 
displaced as well as the effect of disqualification on the employees of the 
employer. 
b) Conditions prescribed by regulation – section 3(c)(ii)
The Minister of Finance is also allowed, after consultation with the 
Minister of Labour, to prescribe specific conditions in respect of the 
granting of the incentive by publishing regulations.  The EM, however, 
makes it clear that, although ‘any’ relevant conditions may be prescribed by 
the Minister of Finance, these conditions should generally be aimed at 
either preventing and addressing any abuse of the incentive or the training 
of employees82. 
Considering that the ETIA is a new piece of legislation, it was 
impossible to produce a complete list of objectionable behaviours that 
employers wanting to access the incentive should not engage in; hence the 
78 Available at: http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation/acts/labour-relations/labour-relations-act
79 Section 5(2) 
80 EM at page 9. 
81 Section 5(1)(a) of the Act. 
82 EM at page 7. 
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need for ministerial intervention should the need arise.83  This provision 
allows some flexibility for the Minister of Finance to address concerns as 
and when they do arise. 
The Legislature also recognised the importance of employee training 
and its relationship with the continued advancement in employment.  The 
EM, however, notes that any conditions set should not be too onerous and 
consequently result in excluding employers from access to the incentive due 
to an inability to provide or facilitate formalised training for employees.84 
4.3.4 Wage regulating measures – section 4 
In order to qualify for and have access to the benefits that the incentive 
offers, an employer needs to satisfy the wage regulation measures in section 4 in 
addition to the requirements under section 3.  
A ‘wage regulation measure’ refers to any collective agreement in terms 
of section 23 of the LRA85, any sectoral determination as determined under section 
51 of the BCEA86 or a bargaining council agreement contemplated in section 31 of 
the LRA, including where such agreement is extended by reason of a 
determination by the Minister of Labour in terms of section 32 of that Act. 87 
In short, an employer will not qualify for the incentive in respect of an 
employee if that employer pays that employee an amount below what is considered 
to be the minimum wage in terms of a wage regulation measure.  If the employer is 
not subject to any wage regulation measure in line with the definition above, that 
employer must pay an employee at least R2 000 per month in order to qualify for 
the incentive.88  If the employee has been in the employ for less than a month, a 
pro rata amount is calculated which must bear the same ratio to R2 000 that the 
number of days that employee worked during the month bears to the total number 
83 EM at page 7 and 8. 
84 EM at page 7 
85 No. 66 of 1995 
86 No. 75 of 1997 
87 Section 4(3) of the ETIA 
88 Section 4(1)(b)(i) and EM at page 8 
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of working days in that month.89 
An employer that claims to qualify and receives the incentive despite not 
satisfying the wage regulation measures shall be subject to a penalty equal to the 
full value of the amount claimed under the incentive, over and above the 
repayment of employees’ tax due to SARS.  This applies for every month that the 
incentive was unduly claimed.90 
4.3.5 Qualifying employees – section 6 
An employer may only claim the benefit or incentive under the ETIA in 
respect of an employee during a particular month if that particular employee meets 
the definition of a ‘qualifying employee’ in terms of section 6.   
Several criteria need to be satisfied before an employee is considered a 
‘qualifying employee’.  These are explained in the table below: 
Criteria91 yes / no92 
1. Was the employee employed by
the employer or an ‘associated
person’93 on or after 1 October
201394?
[Only if answered ‘yes’ can the 
incentive be claimed on condition that 
no’s 2 to 6 below are also satisfied.] 
2. Do any of the following apply?
a) Is the employee not younger
than 18 and not older than
29 at the end of the month
that the incentive is being
claimed?95
or 
89 Section 4(1)(b)(ii) and EM at page 8 
90 EM at page 8 and section 4(2) 
91 These are the criteria set out in section 6 of the ETIA. 
92 Answers to the questions in the left column titled ‘Criteria’ 
93 See definition under 4.3.2 (a) 
94 According to the EM, this date was decided on to ensure that employers did not have to wait for the 
eventual enactment of the ETIA in order to benefit from the incentive (See page 9 of the EM).  
95 Important to note here is the fact that the incentive is claimed on a monthly basis, so an employee may 
qualify one month but be disqualified the next because he or she turned 30 that month. 
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b) Is the employee employed by
an employer that operates
through a fixed place of
business located in a Special
Economic Zone (‘SEZ’) as
designated by notice from the
Minister of Finance in a
Government Gazette and does
that employee render services
mainly to that employer in
that SEZ?
or 
c) Is the employee employed by
an employer in an industry
designated by the Minister of
Finance by way of notice in a
Government Gazette?
[If either (a), (b) or (c) is answered 
‘yes’ the incentive may be claimed on 
condition that the other requirements 
in 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are also satisfied.] 
3. Does the employee:
a) have a valid identity card96
or 
b) is he / she in possession of an
asylum seeker permit97?
[If either (a) or (b) is answered ‘yes’ 
the incentive may be claimed on 
condition that the other requirements 
in 1,2,4,5 and 6 are also satisfied.] 
4. Is the employee not a ‘connected
person’ 98  in relation to the
employer?
[If answered ‘yes’ the incentive may be 
claimed on condition that the other 
requirements in 1,2,3,5 and 6 are also 
satisfied.] 
96 As defined in section 14 of the Identification Act, No. 68 of 1997.  
97 Issued to the employee in terms of section 22(1) of the Refugees Act, No. 130 of 1998. 
98 The definition of ‘connected person’ follows the definition in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 
1962.  Broadly speaking, a natural person would be considered a ‘connected person’ in relation to a company 
if that natural person holds, directly or indirectly, at least twenty percent of equity shares or voting rights in 
that company, whether on his own or with any connected person in relation to that person – See 
Interpretation Note No. 67 (http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-
67%20-%20Connected%20Persons.pdf) for further information. 
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5. Is the employee not considered a
‘domestic worker’99?
[If answered ‘yes’ the incentive may be 
claimed on condition that the other 
requirements in 1,2,3,4 and 6 are also 
satisfied.] 
6. Has the employer satisfied the
wage regulation measures 100  in
section 4 in respect of the
particular employee, i.e. does the
employer pay the particular
employee more than ‘minimum
wage’ or R2 000 per month101?
[If answered ‘yes’ the incentive may be 
claimed on condition that the other 
requirements in 1,2,3,4 and 5 are also 
satisfied.] 
An eligible employer will qualify for the incentive under the ETIA in respect 
of every employee (then being regarded as a ‘qualifying employee’) for whom all six 
the above criteria provide affirmative or ‘yes’ answers. 
4.3.6 Determining the amount of the incentive – section 7 
Eligible employers were entitled to claim the incentive under the ETIA as of 
1 January 2014 onwards and in respect of qualifying employees employed on or 
after 1 October 2013.  The incentive amount which may be deducted from 
employees’ tax payable in terms of the Fourth Schedule of the ITA is calculated on 
a monthly basis and is calculated as the aggregate of the incentive available in 
respect of all qualifying employees for a particular month together with any roll-
over amounts102 from previous months.103   
Treasury prescribed the following five steps in the EM104 to be followed by 
‘eligible employers’ in determining the amount of the incentive for a particular 
99 As defined in section 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 75 of 1997. 
100 See 4.3.4 above. 
101 If any employee earns more than R6000 in a particular month, he / she remains a qualifying employee but 
the amount of the incentive claimable for such employee is nil. See sections 7(2)(d), 7(3)(d) and 4.3.6 infra 
for details. 
102 See 4.3.7 below 
103 See EM page 10. 
104 See EM page 11. 
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month: 
1. Identify all ‘qualifying employees’ in respect of that month
- This is done by considering the six criteria set out in 4.3.5 above.
2. Determine the applicable employment period for each qualifying
employee
- The incentive is only available for the first twenty-four months of the
qualifying employee’s employment.  The amount of the employment tax
incentive in respect of any qualifying employee differs depending on
whether that qualifying employee is in his or her first twelve, or second
twelve months of employment.  To determine whether an employee still
satisfies the twenty-four month requirement or in which twelve month
period he or she falls, the total number of months that the employee has
been employed by the particular eligible employer (or any associated
persons) is taken into account.  The inclusion of ‘associated persons’ in
this determination is to avoid abuse of the incentive by virtue of
redeployment within a group of companies.
- Qualifying employers must pro-rate the incentive in respect of
employees employed for less than 160 hours in a particular month so
that the amount of incentive available bears the same ratio to the total
incentive amount available for that month as the number of hours
worked bears to the number 160105 - see calculation in respect of Ms. D
in the examples below under Step 5 – ‘Aggregate the result’.
3. Determine each employee’s ‘monthly remuneration’
- This entails a simple data entry exercise as qualifying employees have
already been identified in Step 1 in accordance with the criteria in 4.3.5
105 Section 7(5) was substituted by virtue of section 116(1) of Act 43 of 2014 and with effect from 1 March 
2015.  Formerly, the prorated calculation was done on the basis of the ratio that the total remuneration paid to 
the employee bears to the total remuneration such employee would have received if he/she had been 
employed for the entire month.  
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above.  These include the wage regulation measures106 that impose a 
minimum remuneration requirement of R2 000 per month, unless other 
wage regulation measures are in place.   
- In terms of sections 7(2)(d) and 7(3)(d) and when calculating the
monthly incentive, the employment tax incentive is only available to
employers in respect of employees who earn up to a maximum monthly
remuneration amount of R6 000.  If any qualifying employee’s monthly
remuneration exceeds R6 000 for a particular month, the employment
tax incentive in respect of such qualifying employee for that month shall
be nil.107  According to Treasury, the reason for this is ‘to target the
hiring of entry-level workers’.108
4. Calculate the amount of the incentive per qualifying employee
- The table below was included in the EM by Treasury to simplify the
calculation of the incentive per qualifying employee.109  There are 6
different calculations that can occur, depending on the remuneration




Employment Tax Incentive 
per month during the first 
12 months of employment  
Employment Tax Incentive 
per month during the next 
12 months of employment  
R 0 - R2 000 50% of Monthly Remuneration 25% of Monthly Remuneration 
R 2 001 -           
R4 000 
1 000 500 
R 4 001 - 
R6 000 
Formula: R1 000 – (0.5 x 
(Monthly Remuneration – 
R4 000)) 
Formula: R500 – (0.25 x 
(Monthly Remuneration – 
R4 000)) 
R6 001 and up nil nil 
106 See 4.3.4 above. 
107 See sections 7(2)(d) and 7(3)(d) 
108 See EM at page 12. 
109 See EM at page 11. 
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5. Aggregate the result.
- Once the amount of the employment tax incentive for each qualifying
employee has been calculated in accordance with the table above, the
eligible employer may set-off the total aggregate amount (which
includes any roll-over amounts – see 4.3.7 below) against the
employees’ tax payable to SARS.
A basic example is set out below110: 
Facts 
For April 2014, Joe’s Butcher (Joe’s) 
had the following employees: 
Employment tax incentive 
available to Joe’s (with 
calculations and explanations) 
Mr. A whose monthly remuneration was 
R1 800 per month and who was in his 
fourth month of employ with Joe’s; 
Because Mr. A earns below R2 000 per 
month during the first twelve months of 
employment the amount of the 
incentive available is 50% of his 
remuneration, i.e. R900. 
Ms. B whose monthly remuneration was 
R5 200 per month and who was in her 
fourteenth month of employ with Joe; 
Because Ms. B earns between R4 000 
and R6 000 and is in the second twelve 
month period of employment, the 
amount of the employment incentive 
available is R200 [R500- (0.25 x (R5 
200 – R4 000))]. 
Mr. C whose monthly remuneration was 
R2 600 per month and who was in his 
tenth month of employ with Joe’s.  Mr C 
had however worked for an associate 
person (sister company) of Joe’s for 3 
Because Mr. C earns between R2 000 
and R4 000 and because he is 
considered to be in his second twelve 
months of employment, as he had 
worked for an associate person of Joe’s 
for 3 months, the employment incentive 
110 The examples used are a combination of examples 1 to 5 on pages 12 to 14 of the EM. 
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months before joining Joe’s; available is R500. 
Ms. D whose monthly remuneration is 
R4 200 per month but who only worked 
for the last quarter of the month (40 
hours in total), hence she only received 
R1 050; 
Because Ms. D earns between R4 000 
and R6 000 and is in her first twelve 
months of employment the amount of 
the incentive available to Joe’s is R900 
[R1 000 – (0.5 x (R4 200 – R4 000))]; 
but as she only worked for a quarter of 
the month the incentive available is only 
R225 [900 x 40/160]111. 
Mr. E whose monthly remuneration was 
R7 000 per month and who was in his 
14th month of employ with Joe’s. 
Because Mr. E earns more than R6 000 
the incentive available is nil. 
The total aggregate amount of the 
employment incentive that Joe’s can 
therefore deduct from employees’ tax 
payable to SARS is R1 825 
[R900+R200+R500+R225]. 
4.3.7 Roll-over of amounts – section 9 
The total monthly amount by which an eligible employer may reduce 
employees’ tax payable to SARS, is equal to the total incentive amount calculated 
in terms of section 7 (see examples above under 4.3.6) and the excess or rolled-
over amounts from previous months allowable under section 9. 
Section 9 provides for the following three instances where incentive 
amounts may be rolled over and consequently included in the amount of the 
111 See 4.3.6 ‘Determine the applicable employment period for each qualifying employee’ above. As Ms. D 
worked for 40 hours, the incentive available must bear to the total incentive the same ration as 40 does to 
160.
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incentive which may be used to reduce employees’ tax in future months112: 
a) the incentive amount available to a qualifying employer exceeds employees’
tax due to SARS in that month;113
b) a qualifying employer fails to reduce employees’ tax despite being eligible to
do so; 114 or
c) the qualifying employer was not allowed to reduce employees’ tax due to
SARS in previous months by virtue of section 8.115  Section 8 prevents any
available incentive amount being used to reduce the employees’ tax due if
the qualifying employer has any ‘outstanding tax debt’ or has ‘failed to
submit any return’116.
Section 9(4) imposes a limit on the roll-over amount that may be carried 
forward where the incentive amount exceeds employees’ tax due in preceding 
months.117  The limit applies as follows:  
For every qualifying employee in respect of which the incentive may be 
claimed (specifically under (a) above), the amount of the incentive is capped at 
R6  000 on the first day of the month following the end of the period for which 
employers are required to render returns in terms of section 14(3)(a) of the Fourth 
Schedule of the ITA.  Employees’ tax filing and reconciliation periods currently 
span 6 months.  If an employer was therefore required to file an employees’ tax 
return on 28 February 2014, that employer may only roll-over an incentive amount 
of R6 000 per qualifying employee to the 1st of March 2014.  For 6 qualifying 
employees, the employer will be allowed to roll over a maximum of R36 000, 
112 See page 14 of the EM. 
113 See section 9(1) 
114 See section 9(2) 
115 See section 9(3)   
116 Both the terms ‘outstanding tax debt’ and ‘failed to submit any return’ follow the definitions under Tax 
Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 (‘TAA’).   It is worth noting however that ‘outstanding tax debt’ in the 
context of the ETIA and specifically section 8 excludes any debts in respect of which an agreement with 
SARS has been reached in accordance with sections 167 or 204 of the TAA, debts that have been suspended 
in terms of section 164 of the TAA or debts that do not exceed the amount referred to in section 169(4) of the 
TAA. 
117 See EM page 14. 
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which can be set-off against employees’ tax at the end of March 2014.  Any excess 
above the R36 000 shall be unavailable for roll-over.  This process will be repeated 
every 6 months. 
4.3.8 Reimbursement – section 10 
Upon the initial enactment of the ETIA the reimbursement provisions 
under section 10 were still inoperative.  Section 14(2) stipulated that section 10 
would only come into operation on a date determined by the Minister of Finance in 
a Government Gazette.  In terms of Government Notice No. 38346 issued on 18 
December 2014 118 , section 10 took effect on 19 December 2014.  The 
reimbursement provisions operate on a six monthly basis, similar to the ‘roll-over 
of amounts’ provisions in section 9 (see 4.3.7 above).  An employer is entitled to 
reimbursement of the entire incentive amount available as at the end of a 
employees’ tax reconciliation period,119 with the incentive amount then always 
reverting to nil once the reimbursement has been claimed. 120  All reimbursements 
under section 10 shall be paid from the National Revenue Fund and be treated as a 
drawback from revenue charged.121 
Similar to the roll-over provisions in section 9 (see 4.3.7 above), if the 
reimbursement of the incentive is unavailable due to section 8 non-compliance by 
the employer, such reimburseable amounts may be rolled over to the next 
employees’ tax period, but shall be limited to an amount of R6 000 per qualifying 
employee per employees’ tax period.122   
4.3.9 ‘Sunset’ clause & other miscellaneous provisions 
In terms of section 12, any incentive amounts that have not yet been 
deducted from employees’ tax by 31 December 2016, shall be forfeited as the 
incentive shall no longer be effective subsequent to that date. 
118 See: (http://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/employment-tax-incentive-act-26-2013-notice-in-terms-of-
section-14-3-of-coming-into-operation-of-section-10-of-the-act_20141218-GGN-38346-01039) 
119 The employees’ tax reconciliation period refers the current period or cycle of six months for which 
employers are legislatively obliged to file employees’ tax returns in terms of paragraph 14(3)(a) of the Fourth 
Schedule to the ITA.  
120 See section 10(3)  
121 See section 10(2) 
122 See EM at page 17 and 18 
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Section 11 of the ETIA places an obligation on the Minister of Finance to 
publish information on the ETIA twice a year in order to monitor and evaluate the 
success thereof.  To assist the Minister of Finance with this task, the Commissioner 
for SARS is obligated under section 11(1) to submit to the Minister of Finance a 
report, in the prescribed manner and form and containing the prerequisite 
information.   
Some of the other miscellaneous provisions include the ‘Amendments of 
laws’ (i.e. the changes to other legislation) brought about by the ETIA, as set out in 
section 13 and read with the schedule to the ETIA.  In short, these amendments 
include: 
a) that any reduction in employees’ tax in lieu of the incentive under the ETIA
shall be exempt from income tax in terms of section 10(1)(s) of the ITA;123
b) that a qualifying employer may take into account the amount of the
employment tax incentive allowable under the ETIA when paying
employees’ tax that has been withheld over to SARS in terms of paragraph 2
of the Fourth Schedule to the ITA - i.e. employers may pay over only the
reduced amount124; and
c) that SARS is permitted to provide to the Department of Labour all details,
including names and contact details, of employers registered for employees’
tax that claim the employment tax incentive under the ETIA.125
4.3.10 Conclusion
The preceding part of this chapter sets out the most significant details of the
ETIA and the method qualifying employers should follow to calculate the incentive 
on a month-to-month basis.   
My intention with the rest of this chapter is to address some of the criticism 
and concerns raised with regard to this incentive.  This will include providing some 
123 Section 10(s) of the ITA was inserted into the ITA by Act No. 26 of 2013. 
124 Paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule  to the ITA was amended and paragraph 2A of the Fourth Schedule to 
the ITA was inserted by Act No. 26 of 2013. 
125 Section 70 of the TAA was amended by Act No. 26 of 2013. 
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analysis and comments on the section 11 reports issued by the Minister of Finance 
in relation to the ETIA thus far.  I will also put forward some of my own ideas and 
insights.   
4.4 General concerns and criticism 
4.4.1 Introduction 
At this juncture it would be appropriate to consider some of the criticism 
and comments (both positive and negative) from various sources made in regard to 
the ETIA, both prior and subsequent to its enactment on 1 January 2014.  
Whenever new legislation is proposed or enacted it is bound to attract a lot 
of attention from stakeholders, the general public and the media; even more so 
when that legislation is aimed at addressing a contentious socio-economic subject, 
such as the high level of youth unemployment prevalent in South Africa.  The 
likelihood of such criticism is even greater in a multi-cultural society such as ours, 
considering our country’s turbulent history.  If one thinks back over the past 21 
years since the ‘birth’ of South Africa’s democracy, countless examples come to 
mind where the Legislature and the decisions it made to enact new legislation 
came under severe scrutiny from the public and other roleplayers.  Some 
prominent examples include, for instance, the very recent Protection of State 
Information Bill (‘the Secrecy Bill’) in 2015 and the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, No. 46 of 2013.   
The build-up to and enactment of the ETIA was no exception to this, with 
countless academics, politicians, trade unions and the media voicing opinions and 
criticism relating to this socio-economic policy reform.  Of particular significance 
for the purposes of this paper are the comments made by so-called ‘major 
stakeholders’ within the South African labour industry, such as trade unions.  
Considering that trade unions act as a conduit between the two main parties 
affected by the ETIA, i.e. the private sector and the employee market, I will place 
particular emphasis on analysing some of the important concerns raised by them. 
I will also consider comments by economists, relevant and influential international 
institutions and give insights into feedback from government by analysing the 
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Minister of Finance’s feedback on the ETIA in the form of obligatory reports under 
section 11.  In conclusion, I will express some personal views on the matters raised. 
4.4.2  The ETIA: comments and criticisms 
a) The Congress of South African Trade Unions (‘COSATU’)126
In the build-up to the enactment of the ETIA and in response to a document 
referred to earlier in this paper entitled “Confronting youth unemployment: policy 
options for South Africa”127, one of the major players in the South African labour 
market, COSATU, published some comments as to why (in its view) a youth wage 
subsidy such as the one proposed under the ETIA would not be effective in South 
Africa.  Their response was entitled ‘Response of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions’128.  The following (including the reasons why COSATU was opposed 
to a youth wage subsidy) is taken directly from their response document:  
“The National Treasury document relies on international studies to justify 
its proposals on youth wage subsidies, or even employment subsidies.  But careful 
reading of those studies reveal that they lean towards the COSATU position.  
Based on Treasury’s own literature which they used to propose this ill-conceived 
policy, we have shown that there are no empirical grounds for this policy. (…) 
Our reasons include that: 
1. The youth wage subsidy will have significant substitution effects. Firms
will have an incentive to let go of existing workers in order to employ
subsidised ones.
2. The substitution effects are likely to be widespread, especially with the
existence of labour brokers.  This substitution will hit the unskilled and
126 For information on Cosatu, see: 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_South_African_Trade_Unions): “Cosatu is a trade union 
federation in South Africa and was founded in 1985.  It is the largest of South Africa’s three main trade 
unions, altogether organizing 1,8 million workers.” 
127 Issued in February 2011 and available at: 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/Confronting%20youth%20unemployment
%20-%20Policy%20options.pdf) 
128 Published in June 2012 and available at: 
(http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/misc/2013/youthwagesubsidy.pdf) - See page 19 to 24. 
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semi-skilled parts of the workforce the most. 
3. The third reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that it does not
guarantee that training and skills development will take place in the
workplace, less so in the sectors where job-creation is likely to be created:
wholesale and retail trade, personal services and construction.
4. The fourth reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that it will
lead to the recycling of young people without training.  In the literature
they say young people will be fired once the subsidy ends.  National
Treasury (and the Democratic Alliance) dismiss this on the grounds that
“it’s lousy business to fire good workers”.  But the fact that businesses have
moved drastically towards outsourcing, labour broking and casualisation
(of good workers) shows that it is good business to have a workforce that
is vulnerable and flexible.
5. The fifth reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that with major
substitution and increased vulnerability of the workforce, there will be
downward pressure on wages.  Inequality will worsen as low wage
workers replace those that have managed to capture non-wage benefits in
their compensation.
6. The sixth reason why we oppose the subsidy is that there is an underlying
assumption that there is a gap between entry-level wages and productivity
among young workers.
7. The seventh reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that
National Treasury (and the Democratic Alliance) incorrectly assumes that
the wage is the major constraint to job-creation.  The emphasis on the
empirically unsubstantiated gap of an entry-level, or minimum wage, that
is above productivity lies at the heart of National Treasury (and the
Democratic Alliance’s) standpoint.
8. The eighth reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that it will
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simply increase the mark-up of firms without increasing employment.  As 
we have argued above, the reasoning of National Treasury on the 
technical aspects of the youth wage subsidy is partial and incorrect. 
9. The ninth reason why we oppose the youth wage subsidy is that it does not
contribute in addressing the underlying causes of the youth unemployment
problem.  In fact the youth wage subsidy may exacerbate the triple crisis
of poverty, unemployment and inequality.  In South Africa, there exists a
huge possibility that, even if the subsidy is re-designed to improve job-
search, young people in desperation may choose to go straight into
employment rather than increase their educational attainment.  This has
serious long-term impact on the career prospects for young people.”
b) The National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (‘NUMSA’)129
NUMSA, another major player and influential union within in the labour 
market in South Africa also expressed its concerns on its website shortly after the 
ETIA coming into effect, stating that: 
“When we launched the fight against the wage subsidy and the 
Employment Tax Incentive Bill, this was not about just selfishly protecting our 
jobs and conditions of employment or those of our members.  We had principled 
objections to the legislation.  Although government has attempted to deal with 
our concerns and that some of the consequences in the implementation of the 
statute may not occur in our sectors, as NUMSA we have EIGHT reasons why we 
remain opposed to the Employment Tax Incentive Act and we are moving 
forward with our Section 77 notice for a socio-economic strike.”130 
The eight reasons NUMSA referred to, can be summarised as follows131: 
1. The Act places the onus on the working class to subsidise employers.
129 For more information on NUMSA, see 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Union_of_Metalworkers_of_South_Africa): “NUMSA is the single 
biggest trade union in South Africa with more than 338,000 members, and prior to its expulsion on 8 
November 2014, the largest affiliate of COSATU, the country’s largest trade union federation.” 
130 Taken from: (http://www.numsa.org.za/article/striking-youth-jobs/) 





2. According to the ETIA, ‘hand-outs’ to the poor are bad, but good for the 
middle-class. 
 
3. The ETIA is based on the premise that high wages are the reason for 
unemployment; not a lack of capitalists’ investment in business in South 
Africa. 
 
4. All sectors are subject to abuse; even those with wage agreements. 
 
5. Displacement dangers are not entirely eliminated. 
 
6. There are no mandatory training or skills development provisions in the 
ETIA. 
 
7. The Minister of Finance has wide ranging powers. 
 
8. The ETIA bypassed review by the NEDLAC (The National Economic 
Development and Labour Council). 
 
c) Equal Education (‘EE’)132 
Subsequent to the ETIA being passed into law by Parliament in October 
2013, EE voiced its concerns in a document titled ‘Submission to National 
Treasury’133, stating that: 
  “The indications are that the Act will fail in its stated intention of creating 
additional youth employment without jeopardising existing jobs.  What is needed 
is a serious plan to expand the economy.  A youth wage subsidy is not such a 
plan.  In our opinion the Bill is misconceived and should be scrapped.  If the 
government is determined to persist with it, nonetheless, it should go back to the 
                                                            
132 For more information on Equal Education see (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Education): “Equal 
Education (EE) is a movement of learners, parents, teachers and community members working for quality 
and equality in South African education, through research, analysis and activism.” 
133 Available at: (http://www.equaleducation.org.za/content/2013/12/19/2013-11-14-Equal-Education-
Submission-to-Treasury-on-Employment-Tax-Incentive-Bill.pdf) 
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drawing board so that serious attention can be given to eliminating the unfair 
discrimination.   Moreover the Bill does not address the underlying challenges of 
unemployment; instead it represents a serious threat to existing older workers 
and does not provide a durable opportunity for the youth in South Africa.” 
EE also outlined the ten serious problems it had with the law (ETIA), 
namely that134:   
1. The impact on unemployment is likely to be fairly low.
2. We need a growing economy to reduce unemployment.
3. The subsidy could cause displacement (‘churning’) of existing workers.
4. The subsidy could put downward pressure on all wages.
5. What else could usefully be done with the money?
6. The subsidy is not necessarily linked to any training.
7. It discriminates against informal, small businesses with low wages.
8. The period allowed for public comment was too short.
9. No structured process to evaluate the youth wage subsidy has been
announced.
10. The youth wage subsidy proposed by the ETIA creates illusions.
134 Dwane, Y & Brockman, B (2014). Article published at: 
(http:/www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page716 on 11/02/2014) 
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d) Economist Dawie Roodt135
Efficient Group Limited136  Chief Economist, Dawie Roodt, a frequently 
quoted economist in the South African media, believes that the potential for young 
people to be employed by reason of the incentive is low.137  In an article published 
on Moneyweb’s website, it is stated that Roodt believes it will cost (the then) 
Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan “R2bn to R3bn” to implement the tax initiative 
and the jobs created by it will be less successful than initially expected.138 
Roodt is further quoted in the same article as saying: 
 “It (the incentive) addresses the wrong issues of the skills shortage.  We 
are not addressing the real issue.  In theory, you never use a tax system to “do 
stuff”.  This is more of a tax subsidy than a youth wage subsidy,” Roodt explains.  
He (Roodt) added that the Efficient Group would not make use of the 
incentive under the ETIA.  However, and despite the wide-ranging concerns 
surrounding the ETIA, Roodt does not dispute that it will provide some people 
with employment opportunities.139  
e) Feedback from the Minister of Finance
In terms of section 11(2) of the ETIA, the Minister of Finance is required to 
publish information on the employment tax incentive twice a year, based on the 
reports submitted to him by the Commissioner of SARS under section 11(1) of the 
same act.140 
During a sitting of the National Assembly on 12 February 2015, a member of 
parliament raised the issue regarding the expected dates of such publications to 
the new Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Nene141.  The Minister responded as follows:   
135 More info at: 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=116726172&ticker=EFG:SJ) 
136 See (http://www.efgroup.co.za) 
137 Article at: (http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/private-sector-sceptical-about-youth-wage-subsidy/) 
138 Ibid 137 
139 Ibid 137 
140 See 4.3.9 supra 




“Yes, in compliance with section 11 of the ETI Act No 26 of 2013, the 
Minister of Finance published information on the Employment Tax Incentive on 
the following two occasions during:  
• the 2014 Budget on 26 February 2014142; and 
• the 2014 Medium-Term Policy Statement on 22 October 2014.143  
Given that 2014 was the first year of implementation, the above information 
was of necessity limited.  The third and latest update provided is in the 2015 
Budget Review (refer to page 27 published on 25 February 2015).  This update 
notes that in December 2014, this incentive supported the employment of over 
216 000 young workers, from a peak of 268 000 in August 2014.  A further 
update will be provided later this year, in October when the next MTBPS is tabled 
in Parliament.”144 
According to a further statement on 15 January 2015 by Treasury in an article 
on Southafrica.info, 270 000 people had found jobs since the ETIA came into 
force.145  A spokesperson for Treasury, Jabulani Sikhakhane, further confirmed 
that 29 000 employers were making use of the incentive under the ETIA. 
Sikhakane also said146: 
“National Treasury is working with SARS to use the data that is included in 
the bi-annual reporting requirements from employers to create a more detailed 
assessment of the impact of the Act on youth employment. This work is still 
progressing, but a report will be published when the analysis is complete.   
 
As the incentive progresses and more data become available it will be easier 
to investigate these specific questions and they will be covered in any report that 
is published on the incentive.  More time is required to adequately assess the 
                                                            
142 See: (http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/speech/speech.pdf) at page 20. 
143 See: (http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2014/mtbps/speech.pdf) at page 13. 
144 Available at: 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/Publications/other/MinAnsw/2015/Reply%20to%20PQ%2068%20[NW70E].pd
f) 
145 Article available at: (http://www.southafrica.info/services/government/employment-tax-
16115.htm#.VXKU0VwxG8U) 
146 Ibid 145 
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overall success of this policy, as it is dependent on the number of new jobs created 
and the future opportunities and progression of employees who were hired as a 
result of the incentive.  The incentive will then be up for review in 2016, where 
adjustments may be made to improve its impact and effectiveness.” 
What is clear however, according to Sikhakhane, is that “the initial take up of 
the incentive had been higher than expected.”147 
f) JustJobs network148 – Gregory Randolph
In October 2014, JustJobs network issued a report titled ‘Overcoming the 
Youth Employment Crisis: Strategies from Around the Globe’149, which comprised 
an analysis of several counter-unemployment measures from around the world.  
(Note: South Africa is ranked at 125 out of 148 in JustJobs’ index ranking with 
regard to successes in employing the youth.) 
One of the chapters in this report featured the specific challenges faced by 
the youth in the South African job market and assessed the ETIA as a counter-
unemployment measure.  The author concluded his analysis of the potential 
impact of the ETIA as follows150: 
"The ETI is an important measure to curb high youth unemployment in the 
short run, and it is likely that the program will open doors for young people to 
enter the labor market and become more employable.  However, it is by no 
means a panacea for South Africa’s youth entering the labor market.  The ETI 
must be linked to strategies that include up-skilling South Africa’s youth, growing 
small businesses and promoting labour-intensive sectors if it is to have the 
desired impact of improving youth employment outcomes in the long term.  
147 Ibid 145 
148 The JustJobs Network is the vision of John Podesta, who founded and incubated the organization within 
the Center for American Progress – For more information see (http://justjobsnetwork.org/history/) 
149 Available at: 
(http://justjobsnetwork.org/wpcontent/pubs/reports/Overcoming%20the%20Youth%20Employment%20Crisi
s.pdf)
150 Available at: (http://justjobsnetwork.org/wp-content/pubs/reports/DPRU.pdf)
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To this end, policymakers should increase awareness of the scheme among 
small businesses and ensure that the cost-benefit analysis for linkages to skill 
development in countries like Australia increase the likelihood that improved 
employment outcomes will be sustained in the long run.  To preempt a backlash 
from trade unions, Spain involved them (small businesses) in the process of policy 
design and implementation.  
Most importantly, South Africa must explore ways to link the subsidy with 
skill development more directly – for instance, by offering a skilling component 
to program participants aligned with their occupation.  In this way, the ETI can 
serve another goal – strengthening the linkages between labor market demand 
and vocational training – and its impact can be more sustainable.  
Through close evaluation and tracking of the program’s success as it 
evolves, South African policymakers can ensure that the ETI is contributing 
positively to a larger policy architecture aimed at lifting young people out of 
joblessness.”151 
The author of the report identified two major obstacles that the employment 
incentive would have to overcome in order to be successful: 
  Firstly, the fact that a huge compliance burden is placed on employers that 
want access to the incentive under the ETIA in that they have to register their 
payroll under the PAYE (pay-as-you-earn) system and secondly, the lack of 
awareness amongst small businesses which, according to the JustJobs report, must 
play a critical role in the reduction of youth unemployment.152 
4.4.3 Conclusion and personal views 
As far as expressing a personal view on the potential successes and failures 
of the ETIA as counter unemployment measure in general goes, I will reserve my 
views to Chapter 6.  At this stage it is appropriate however to elaborate somewhat 
on the foremost concerns raised by stakeholders and commentaries in 4.4.2 above 
and express some personal views on it.  I will address each common concern under 
151 Ibid 150 
152 Ibid 150 
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a separate heading. 
a) Practicality
From the above, it is apparent that there are more misgivings about than 
support for the ETIA; specifically in regard to its actual practicality and 
workability.  From a practical perspective it seems that employers do have to ‘jump 
through several hoops’ in order to obtain a benefit which, in the bigger scheme of 
things, does not seem to be substantial, especially for larger businesses or 
corporations.  
As the report from JustJobs network (see 4.4.2 (f)) pointed out, in order to 
lay any claim to the benefit under the ETIA, an employer needs to be registered for 
PAYE with SARS in terms of paragraph 15 of the Fourth Schedule to the ITA.153  
Personal experience leads me to think that, generally speaking, only medium to 
large scale businesses would actually have the capacity to process data and 
information for PAYE purposes on a month-to-month basis in order to be eligible 
to claim the incentive.  That then begs the question: Are these medium and big 
businesses that will be able to obtain the benefit from this incentive, really the 
employers that the ETIA should be targeting?  As the JustJobs network report 
correctly pointed out, and for the ETIA to truly serve its intended purpose, small 
businesses ought to be the major utilisers of this incentive under the ETIA.  Small 
businesses are the ones that could really benefit from the incentives, considering 
their comparably smaller tax base.  Smaller businesses would also benefit from any 
increase in workforce and even more so when this increase comes at a cheaper 
than usual cost.  It seems, however, that so-called ‘smaller businesses’ are 
generally unaware of the availability of the incentive; and those that are aware of it 
may not have the actual business acumen and resources to register for PAYE and 
process monthly data - making them ineligible employers under the ETIA. 
For medium to large businesses that do have the capacity to process 
monthly PAYE data (most of them being registered to do so already), the benefits 
under the ETIA would be negligible unless they employ a substantial number of 
qualifying employees.  This is rather unlikely though, due to these employees’ lack 
153 See section 3(a) of the ETIA 
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of skills and experience.  Potential employees who can qualify as ‘qualifying 
employees’ and do have the necessary skill-set and experience to add real value, 
will in most cases already be employed elsewhere.   
Considering the above, together with the proposed short duration of the 
ETIA (due under section 12 to be discontinued at the end of 2016), it does not 
make much sense for businesses to pursue this short term tax benefit, whilst 
having to train generally unskilled and inexperienced employees. 
b) Lack of training
Another recurring concern under ‘comments and criticisms’ (see 4.4) is the 
fact that the ETIA does not address the real and fundamental reasons for the high 
levels of unemployment among youths in South Africa - the foremost being a lack 
of appropriate education and/or skills.   
Under the ETIA, employers are rewarded for granting employees who fall 
within a certain age group (18 to 29) the opportunity to enter the job market - but 
not for ensuring that these employees get adequate exposure to, for instance, skills 
training, or, at least, not as of yet - as section 3(c)(ii) does provide that the Minister 
of Finance may issue regulations that make it compulsory for employers to expose 
employees to a certain level of training in order to qualify for the incentive (see 
4.3.3 (b)).  Compulsory training would ensure that employees are more 
employable once the ETIA (and the incentive thereunder) has ‘run its course’.  To 
add to this, initial indications are that the lifetime of the ETIA will only be three 
years (section 12 of the ETIA indicates that no incentives under the ETIA are 
receivable after 1 January 2017), which renders the potential reasons for employers 
to make use of the incentive even more unjustifiable.   
Without any requirements or conditions as to skills development and 
training placed on employers, there seems to be no other good reason/(s) to make 
use of this mechanism, other than obtaining a short-term tax saving by employing 
(and not necessarily training) eligible employees.  At the end of 2016, employers 
that made use of the incentive will be able to say that they have saved “X” amount 
of tax; however it is highly improbable that employees employed in terms of the 
ETIA would be able to claim that they have substantially added to their skill-set 
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due to the lack of a compulsory training that employers are required to provide.  
This omission in the ETIA seems to be in conflict with its purpose, being ‘to 
encourage employment creation’154, considering that it is unlikely that employers 
will retain generally unskilled employees after 31 December 2016. 
c) Unfair discrimination
A third common concern is that the ETIA opens the door for employers to 
unfairly discriminate against certain groups of employees in order to obtain the 
incentive under the ETIA.  Most notably, ‘older’ employees would be at a 
disadvantage as the costs to keep them in the employ would be (depending on pre-
existing wages) higher than hiring a younger employee who falls within the eligible 
age category of the ETIA, i.e. between 18 and 29.  The displacement prohibition 
and penalty provisions in section 5 are aimed at discouraging such actions by 
employers, but its actual effect is questionable as only ‘automatically unfair 
dismissals’ under the LRA155 would be deemed to constitute an act of displacement 
by an employer. 
Jonathan Jones, a director and employment law practitioner at Norton Rose 
Fulbright South Africa also points out the following in this regard156:  
“Whilst the Act has a laudable purpose, employers should be cautioned 
against amending their recruitment practices to qualify for a greater benefit in 
terms of the incentive scheme.  The Act attempts to avoid abuse of the incentive 
scheme by penalising employers for deliberately replacing older employees with 
younger employees, but it fails to address a more fundamental issue: the fact that 
relying on age as the determining ground for employment would very likely 
constitute unfair discrimination based on age. 
Even though affirmative action will always be a contentious subject, 
preferring employees based on race, gender or disability is properly legislated 
154 See section 2(1) of the ETIA 
155 Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 
156 Article available at: (http://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2015/04/age-discrimination-and-the-
employment-tax-incentive-act/) 
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and acceptable.  No similar exceptions are applicable for preferring candidates 
for employment based on age.  Where a candidate for employment fails to be 
appointed because they are older than 29 years of age, the aggrieved candidate 
for employment may well have a valid claim for unfair discrimination against 
the prospective employer.” 
Despite section 5, it is still arguable and likely that older employees or 
candidates might be discriminated against due to the particular benefits that the 
ETIA offer employers. 
d) Downward pressure on minimum wages
Trade unions COSATU and NUMSA argue that the incentive paves the way 
for employers wanting access to the incentive under the ETIA to rather employ 
employees who fall within the allowable wage range, i.e. those that earn less than 
R6 000 per month.  Consequently, relatively unskilled and bottom-end employees 
would have to ‘settle for less’ so as to make themselves more employable to 
employers, in that they would be qualifying employees under the ETIA. 
Logic dictates that, for an individual who is unemployed and potentially 
unemployable due to a lack of skills or experience, any wage is better than no wage. 
In a developing economy like South Africa, imposing a minimum wage hampers 
competition between employees and is detrimental to business development and 
entrepreneurship, as business owners or entrepreneurs may shy away from 
expanding operations or setting up new businesses due to potentially high wages.  
This, according to the reasoning by trade unionists, consequently diminishes the 
job market and opportunities as the demand for employees becomes lower than it 
ought to be. 
In chapter 5 that follows I will conduct a comparative study of the ETIA and 
wage subsidies enacted in other countries in order to point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of the ETIA.  I will provide my reasons for selecting each particular 
country I use as a yardstick as I proceed with the analysis.   In chapter 6, I intend 
to provide some of my personal views on the ETIA’s potential to succeed or fail. 
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Chapter 5 
 A study of similar legislation in other countries 
5.1 Introduction 
From the examples provided in Chapter 2 (see 2.3), it is evident that South 
Africa is not the first country to use a wage subsidy or similar legislative 
intervention to achieve (or at least attempt to achieve) a socio-economic goal, for 
instance to combat youth unemployment.   
In this penultimate chapter, I intend to delve deeper into some of the wage 
subsidies, or policies akin to the incentive under the ETIA, that have been used in 
other countries to try and achieve a particular socio-economic goal.  The examples 
I have selected include Colombia’s first job law, the Joven projects in Chile and 
Argentina and Singapore’s wage credit scheme.  Each example will be discussed 
under a separate heading.  As an introduction, I will provide some background on 
each of the examples I have selected and give my reasons for selecting each of 
them.  This will be followed by a more detailed analysis on how each incentive was 
intended to function.  I will conclude the discussion of each example by providing 
some insights on comments in support of, or criticisms of these respective 
incentives and also briefly compare each example with the incentive under the 
ETIA.  Hopefully, this approach will enable me to draw comparisons and point out 
differences between the ETIA and these examples to ultimately express a view on 
the potential for success or failure of the ETIA.   
I also intend to provide a brief summary of programmes introduced in 
Brazil, Indonesia and India to address unemployment, specifically youth 
unemployment issues. 
5.2  Colombia  - ‘First Job Law’ (2010) 
5.2.1 Background and reason for selection 
I have already provided brief comments on Colombia’s Formalisation and 
Creation of Jobs Act No. 1429 of 2010, otherwise known as the ‘First Employment 
Act’ under paragraph 2.3 (f).  In order to facilitate and simplify the formal 
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organisation of a business, as well as to create more ‘formal employment’, the 
Colombian Congress followed a straightforward approach to introducing reform to 
the foundations of corporations and corporation law.157  At the same time, this 
First Employment Act created some interesting incentives.  One of these was a tax 
credit for employers, which was allowed against payroll contributions in respect of 
any newly-hired employees under the age of 28, women over 40 years old, workers 
earning less than USD 430 per month or employees in displacement or with a 
disability.158 
It is fair to say that when conducting a study of a socio-ecomic policy or 
decision made by government, one normally expects more negative comments and 
criticism than positive ones.  It is not unusual for people to criticise rather than to 
compliment, especially when it comes to governments and the decisions they 
make.  As a part of my research in the lead up to completing this paper, I came 
accross an article by Adam Thomson on the Financial Times’ website on June 3 
2013, titled “Booming Bogota nightlife enjoys a feelgood factor”159.  This article 
more or less describes the turnaround in the economic prospects of young people 
in Colombia, particularly in its capital city, Bogotá.  Some excerpts from the article 
that particularly caught my attention include: 
“Go back a decade or more, and Bogotá felt much like the chilly and 
conservative Andean city that it always used to be. (…)  Today, the screens have 
all but gone but there is a feel-good factor arguably stronger than at any time in 
living memory.  The economy is growing fast clip and a demographic boom – a 
quarter of the country’s population is aged between 14 and 28 – has produced an 
explosion in demand for entertainment – above all, nightlife. (…) 
The growing sense of optimism among Bogotá’s young crowd marks a 
fundamental shift compared with the previous generation, which, equipped with 
sufficient education, money or both, would often leave at the first chance.  Basic 
jobs may not pay particularly well, but at least there are more of them.  Besides, 
several government schemes, such as the ‘first job law’, which gives employers 
157 News Alert by Prieto and Carrizosa Law Firm.  New Law Partially Overhauls Corporate Law 
Foundations and Creates Incentives for New Businesses, available at:  (www.prietocarrizosa.com/en). 
158Ibid 157 
159 Available at (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8864951a-a818-11e2-8e5d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cRGnDoTG) 
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tax breaks for increasing their overall headcount by taking on young people, 
have started to make a difference.” (Own emphasis) 
This particular reference to the positive effects of the ‘First Employment 
Act’ on the Colombian job market for young work seekers, together with the fact 
that Colombia is also a developing economy like South Africa – therefore also 
enjoying its fair share of socio-economic problems, including high levels of crime 
and poverty – convinced me of the potential value of further investigation into its 
nature and functions. 
5.2.2  Operation 
The First Employment Act comprises four chapters, which are all aimed at 
stimulating job creation for youths, either directly by incentivising employers to 
appoint them, or indirectly by making it easier and cheaper to do business in 
Colombia through corporate reforms.160   
The four chapters of the Colombian law can be broken down as follows161: 
o The first chapter deals directly with the stimulation of first employment,
targeting youths under the age of 28; directing the creation of incentives
for enterprises to formalise employment through micro credit orientated
programs.  It also prescribes updated procedures for ‘easing’ new, small
businesses into the tax system on a gradual basis, with such businesses
being exempted from paying any income tax in the first two years of
operation.  During the third year only 25% of the tax due is payable, 50%
in the fourth year and 75% in the fifth year.162
More importantly for purposes of this study, this chapter also provides
for ‘discounts’ on the costs of appointment and employment of persons
under the age of 28, i.e. by creating a tax credit to be set-off by employers
against payroll taxes.163
160 For more information see: (http://colombialawbiz.com/2010/12/18/the-law-of-first-employment-towards-
formalization-through-incentives-a-national-database-and-regulatory-reforms/) 
161 Ibid 160 
162 Ibid 160 
163 Ibid 160 
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The discount method is best explained by way of an example164: 
Concept Regular tax 
calculation* 
Calculation after 
taking into account 
the first job law 
incentive* 
Gross Revenue 80,000,000 80,000,000 
Minus Cost and 
Expenses 
65,000,000 65,000,000 
Minus: Payroll (1,000,000) 
Tax base 14,000,000 15,000,000 
Income tax (@34%) 4,760,000 5,100,000 
Minus: Tax Credits 0 (1,000,000) 
Net Income tax 
payable 
4,760,000 4,100,000 
*All amounts are in Colombian Peso
 Most noticeable from the above, is the fact that the payroll expenses 
incurred by employers can be set off against income tax payable, as 
opposed to being a standard deduction before the tax payable is calculated, 
thus providing a 66% increase in benefit for employers – see amounts in 
bold type.   
o The second chapter simplifies and reduces the prescribed procedures and
expenses pertaining to the liquidation of enterprises.
o The third chapter attempts to simplify bureaucratic procedures to be
followed when setting up a business and chapter 4 purports to establish a
national employment database.165
164 This example is based on my personal interpretation of the credit available under the First Employment 
Act for hiring employees under the age of 28. 
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5.2.3 Comparison with the ETIA and public comments 
The wage subsidy under the First Employment Act differs somewhat from 
the incentive under the ETIA, in the sense that the former forms part of a broader 
and more general overhaul of Colombian corporation law aimed at economic 
expansion and the accompanying creation of a platform to facilitate the 
employment of youths that goes with it.  Several similarities can, however, still be 
drawn between these two counter-unemployment measures.  Ultimately, in both 
instances, employers are rewarded by way of a reduction in their tax liabilities 
(whether income tax in Colombia or employees’ tax in South Africa) for employing 
first time jobseekers that meet certain other criteria. 
Interestingly, many of the concerns raised by stakeholders in South Africa 
(see COSATU and NUMSA comments in 4.4.2) also seem to be problem areas 
arising from the ‘First Job Law’.   
According to a news report broadcasted by the Colombian television news 
station teleSUR, on 27 February 2015166, it appears from a statement by the 
General Labor Confederation that the First Employment Law has been ‘less 
effective than expected in comparison to benefits granted to companies’, with 
unemployment under youths (14 to 28 years old) increasing by 0,4% during the 
last 3 months of 2014.  Some of the criticism of the ‘First Job Law’ raised in this 
report include that it requires strengthening of its flexibility, that it lacks 
formalising of outsourcing, and that it enhances the instability of experienced 
workers in exchange for less experienced workers, thereby weakening overall 
labour conditions.167  The report further makes it known that since the enactment 
of the First Employment Act, there appears to have been an overall increase in job 
creation; however, such created jobs are mostly of a low quality and of short 
duration, with 49,4% of jobs in the last quarter of 2014 being recorded as informal 
employment.168 
165 Ibid 160 
166 See video at (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UgwtZc2XAn0) 
167 Ibid 166 
168 Ibid 166 
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Furthermore, in an online article published by Quarterly Americas, Council 
of the Americas169, Lorenzo Morales writes as follows170: 
“The core of the law can be synthetized by two basic strategies: 
encouraging young people to create companies through special state-financed 
loans and using fiscal discounts to reward companies who hire a young labour 
force. 
But the well-intentioned law risks clashing with harsh reality: the severe 
disconnection between the skills we are teaching to our future labour force and 
what industries need.  Most governmental efforts are oriented toward creating 
more qualified workers, but without reliable information on the abilities that new 
and growing industries are desperately demanding.  (…) 
But adjusting a law is much easier than adjusting people’s expectations 
about a promised future.  A youth labour law should also tackle cultural and 
deep-rooted practices that work against any intention of guaranteeing young 
people a better future through a decent work. (…) 
With so little information on the workforce that Colombia needs, entering 
the job market resembles searching for a seat in a dark and crowded movie 
theater.  You can either sit on the dirty floor wondering why you paid for such a 
bad seat or simply, as it might be more often the case, leave the theater.  No 
refunds.” (Own emphasis) 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the above comments, it is that 
rewarding employers for employing young and generally unskilled youths will not 
remedy a youth unemployment crisis in the long run, especially in a developing 
country where youths generally suffer from poor education and a lack of basic 
skills.  This proposed solution seems to overlook the real and most fundamental 
issues that lead to these high unemployment levels.  Based on the Colombian 
example, it is difficult to foresee much success for the ETIA in helping to address 
South Africa’s youth unemployment issues. 
169 Americas Quarterly is an AAM audited magazine dedicated to policy analysis and debate of economics, 
finance, social development and politics in the Western Hemisphere – See: 
(https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Americas_Quarterly) 
170 Article available at (www.americasquarterly.org/node/2382) 
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5.3  Argentina (Proyecto Joven: 1994) & Chile (Chile Joven: 1991) 
5.3.1 Background and reason for selection 
Projecto Joven and Chile Joven (‘Joven programmes’) were introduced as 
mechanisms to combat an increase in youth unemployment in Argentina and Chile 
respectively.  Both were very similar in their operation and were implemented as 
subsidies towards special training schemes, aimed at younger people who had not 
been part of the formal educational systems of the relevant countries since a young 
age.  The objective of these programmes was to train at least 100,000 youths 
between the ages of 15 and 24, each over a four-year period171, and both comprised 
two parts: six-month training courses and simultaneous assisted business 
placements or apprenticeships.   
The basis for choosing these programmes as yardsticks for the ETIA, despite 
their method of operation being very different, is that both were implemented to 
address the same issue as the ETIA - youth unemployment.  Commentary indicates 
that both programmes were reasonably successful because they aimed to address 
what would seem to be the fundamental reason for youth unemployment in most 
countries: a lack of proper education and basic skills.172  Neither Projecto Joven 
nor Chile Joven targetted employers to solve unemployment issues; both rather 
focussed on employees and the development of their basic skills. 
5.3.2 Operation and public comments 
As mentioned, both Joven programmes offered special skills training to 
underprivileged youths who did not have the opportunity to finish school, thus 
granting these youths a ‘second chance’ at obtaining some form of further 
education and skills training.   
Funding came from a combination of domestic fiscal resources and support 
from the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank)173 and both programmes were 
organised by way of a public tender process during which educational and training 
171 As per a report by The Overseas Development Institute published in February 2006.  For more 
information see (http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4068.pdf) 
172 Ibid 171 at page 1 
173 Ibid 171 at page 1 
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institutions had to bid to present the course.  The idea was to ensure that the 
programmes were market-driven and the institutions entrusted to present them 
were advised to design training courses with innovative approaches, taking into 
account all relevant market factors.174 
The content of the Chile Joven programme was summarised as follows in a 
report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(‘UNESCO’)175, in collaboration with the International Centre for Technical and 
Vocational Education and Training (‘UNEVOC’)176: 
“The Chile Joven program was targeted at a group of urban youth 
considered to be “at risk”.  The initiatives that were replicated from this program 
targeted to the youth and disadvantaged population with low chances of 
insertion into the formal labour market.   
The programs provide both classroom and on-the-job training.   Chilean 
policymakers envisioned a programme that would train disadvantaged young 
people and would provide them with a practical experience in the formal labour 
market, thus helping them to improve their labour market insertion.  The 
objective of these training models is to increase the employability of the young 
and/or disadvantaged population and to improve the quality of employment.  
The programs can improve employability for young people in the medium 
or short term.  The programs can also reduce the costs of job-seeking for the 
youngsters and reduce the costs for firms of gathering information about 
potential employees.”177 (Own emphasis) 
Each programme consisted of two short courses – each an average of six 
months in duration.  The first course was normally a theoretical training class and 
174 Ibid 171 at page 3 
175 UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) – “Its purpose is to contribute to peace and 
security by promoting international collaboration through education, science, and culture in order to further 
universal respect for justice, the rule of law, and human rights along with fundamental freedom proclaimed in 
the United Nations Charter.” More at: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNESCO) 
176 More information at: (http://www.unevoc.unesco.org/go.php) 




the second a practical placement at a professional firm or enterprise.178  By being 
cost-free for individuals attending, these programmmes eliminated the usual 
barrier of cost that arises for the extremely poor.  Companies could also take part 
at no cost.179   
A series of studies have shown the following three positive outcomes from 
these Joven programmes180: 
o Even though the impacts of the programmes varied somewhat due to the
characteristics of participants, the general labour insertion (i.e. the actual
number of young people that enter the labour market) increased in both
Chile and Argentina.
o A substantial proportion of the participants of these programmes (20,8%
in Argentina, per Mitnik, 1997) decided to return to formal education
thereafter, suggesting improved levels of confidence, ambition and
initiative.
o The programmes had some positive effects on the labour earnings of
certain groups of the employee market.181
The report by UNESCO (in conjunction with UNEVCO) titled ‘Chile Joven, 
Job Training Programs in Latin America’ concluded its findings on the Chile 
programme as follows182: 
“Results show that the programmes can generate positive impacts on the 
labor insertion conditions of their participants.  They are assessed to have 
significant positive impacts in terms of employment for women, and overall the 
impacts range from null to positive. They increase the employment rate of 
178 Ibid 171 at page 2 
179 Ibid 171 at page 3 
180 Examples of these studies include: Aedo C. (2004). Job Training Programmes: The Cases of Chile Joven 
and Argentina Proyecto Joven. Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile; Elías V. J., Ruiz Núñez F., Cossa R., 
Bravo D. (2004). An Econometric Cost- Benefit Analysis of Argentina’s Youth Training Programme. BID, 
Washington, D.C. 
181 Ibid 171 at page 3 




participants and enhance the quality of jobs (measured by wages, social security 
and/or formality).” 
A separate report by the Overseas Development Insitute, entitled ‘Youth 
Training | Chile and Argentina (February 2006)’183 suggests that the following 
lessons can be taken from the Joven programmes: 
o Labour market training that focuses on youngsters that abandon
education is not a permanent or definitive solution and will never provide
a substitute for formal education and training.
o Youth training programmes of this nature will only be effective in a
favourable economic environment, i.e. in a country with sustainable
growth and flexible labour laws that facilitate job creation.
o The public tender process, by which private institutions were appointed
to design these programmes, was highly effective.
5.3.3 Comparison with the ETIA 
In contrast to the ETIA and the incentive under the Colombian ‘First Job 
law’, employers’ involvement in the Joven programmes in Chile and Argentina was 
not quantifiable and was limited to accommodating short-term internships or 
placements of young work-seekers.  The Joven programmes focused on the 
employees and were introduced to directly address their actual lack of skills or 
education.  They did so by granting them a ‘second chance’ at education and 
training to make them more employable.   
Instead of spending a portion of the fiscal budget to incentivise employers 
into hiring young employees, like the ETIA (a short-term solution in my view), the 
governments of Chile and Argentina spent money on directly and pro-actively 
developing the basic skills of employable youngsters.   
This seems to me to be a much more sensible approach to address the 
fundamental causes for high unemployment. 
183 Available at: (http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4068.pdf) 
66
5.4 Singapore – Wage Credit Scheme (2013) 
5.4.1 Background and reason for selection 
The Singaporean government acted in a proactive manner when it decided 
to introduce the Wage Credit Scheme (‘WCS’) in 2013.  Singapore was and is 
increasingly developing into one of the world’s most important financial centres, 
connecting the East with the West.  With its economic progress came certain 
demographical changes within the Singaporean workforce, most notably the 
introduction of a big ‘expatriate’ community, a phenomenon which is also common 
in other Asian cities that are successful in the world economy, such as Hong Kong 
and Shanghai, China.  To lure highly-qualified, professional expatriates to the city, 
companies in Singapore more often than not offer them extremely competitive 
remuneration packages.   
The Singaporean government recognised that companies needed to spend 
these large sums on expatriate employees to remain competitive within the 
international market and, at the same time, that this caused these companies’ 
budgets for hiring local Singaporean employees to become significantly smaller.  It 
was therefore decided to introduce the WCS as a subsidy for Singaporean 
employers to put them in a position to also continue hiring local employees in the 
expanding market. 
Although the WCS is not a direct subsidy aimed at combatting youth 
unemployment (like the one under the ETIA), it remains a governmental 
intervention by way of wage subsidy, similar to the ETIA, used in Singapore to 
ensure that unemployment levels of local Singaporeans remain low.  It is also a 
firm-side wage subsidy with a limited lifespan, like the ETIA.  My reason for 
selecting the WCS as an example is to illustrate what can (and should) be achieved 
if governments are alert to immediate risks of increases in unemployment levels.   
The unemployment rate in Singapore has remained relatively consistent 
between 1,8% and 2% between 2013 and 2015184 and it was announced in the 2015 
184 See: (www.tradingeconomics.com/singapore/unemployment-rate) 
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National Budget that the duration of the WCS would be extended by two more 
years, i.e. to 2016 and 2017.185 
5.4.2 Operation and public comments 
The WCS works as follows186: 
In any calendar year from 2013 to 2017, employers qualify for a wage credit 
in respect of employees in their service that are Singaporean Citizens (in terms of 
the Constitution of Singapore) if they 
a) give at least a SGD50 increase in gross monthly wage to Singaporean
Citizen employees earning up to SGD4,000 in gross monthly wages, and
b) make CPF187 contributions for these employees for at least three months
in the year of the wage increase; and, in addition
c) the employees who receive the wage increase must have received CPF
contributions for at least three months with one employer in the
preceding year.
Under the WCS, the Singaporean government co-funded 40% of the wage 
increases given to Singaporean employees in respect of whom the above-named 
criteria were met from 2013 to 2015.188  For 2016 and 2017, the governmental co-
funding will be 20%.  The WCS operates as a cash grant to employers that meet the 
qualifying criteria but is not paid pursuant to any legislation, hence no employer 
has an absolute right thereto.189 
The IRAS (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore) notes as follows on its 
website: 
“During this period of economic restructuring, businesses could face a tight 
labour market with rising wages.  Through the Scheme, the government provides 
185 The WCS was initially introduced for 3 years, from 2013 to 2015.  See IRAS FAQ’s at: 
(www.iras.gov.sg/IRASHome/Schemes/Businesses/Wage-Credit-Scheme--WCS-/) 
186 Ibid 185 at ‘General Questions on the Scheme’ 
187 The CPF refers to Singapore’s Central Provident Fund, a social security savings plan for citizens of old 
age.  For more information see: (www.cpf.gov.sg/) 
188 Ibid 185 
189 Ibid 185 
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businesses with co-funding support for wage increases made to their employees. 
This would allow businesses to free up resources to invest in productivity, and to 
share productivity gains with their employees.” 
As one would expect, some comments and points of criticism have been 
raised in response to the introduction of the WCS.   In an article in the Singapore 
Business Review on 11 March 2013, a Human Resources practitioner Adrian Tan 
said the following190:  
“Yes, it will help to narrow the Gini coefficient191.  So statistically we would 
look prettier, for sure.  But that ultimately still doesn’t justify the huge wage 
increase that companies might be giving or compelled to give due to internal and 
external pressures if there were little productivity gains.  And should that 
happen, the financing of the wage increase has to come from somewhere.  So we 
probably could be seeing an economy wide inflation contributed to an extent by 
this scheme. 
I would be concerned that companies start using this scheme as the only 
way to retain talents because they would be in big trouble after 2015.  I can 
already foresee the creative ways some companies may apply into their 
compensation and benefits structure so as to maximise this scheme.  This includes 
hiring at a lower than average salary and incorporating a higher amount of 
increment upon confirmation.” 
Another interesting publication relating to the WCS, and in particular the 
use by companies of funds received under the WCS, was published on the website 
of efinancialcareers on 8 April 2015.192  In the article, the writer Simon Mortlock 
explains: 
“UOB 193 , though, is encouraging more of its rank-and-file staff in 
Singapore to look good on the job.  The bank is using the SGD3,8million it 
received under the WCS to fund career development and wellness programmes 
190 Available at: (www.sbr.com.sg/hr-education/commentary/would-wage-credit-scheme-work-1) 
191 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of 
a nation’s residents, and is the most commonly used measure of inequality.  See: 
(https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient) 
192 See: (www.news.efinancialcareers.com/au-en/204591/uob-funds-personal-grooming-courses-for-staff/) 
193 United Overseas Bank 
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for all its 3,600 employees at a junior managerial level or below.  They will 
receive credits to spend on training programmes of their choice – including 
service excellence, computer software and (…) personal grooming sessions.  Rival 
Singaporean bank OCBC194 took a different approach to the money it received 
under the WCS – it gave staff a payout last year.” 
5.4.3 Comparison with the ETIA 
Like the ETIA, the WCS is an employer-targeted wage subsidy introduced 
for a limited period of time with the aim of alleviating some form of 
unemployment problem, whether it already exists or is potentially imminent.  
Considering that the economic and labour climate in Singapore differs materially 
from that in South Africa (unemployment levels are less than a fifteenth of South 
Africa’s), this comparison may seem somewhat irrelevant.  I do believe, however, 
that the WCS shows that employer-side wage subsidies can be effective and of real 
value if the accompanying market factors support its introduction and facilitate its 
positive impact.   
In South Africa, where an acute youth unemployment issue exists, such a 
policy cannot single-handedly solve, or even minimally contribute to solving such a 
problem.  I intend to elaborate further in the final chapter on my claim that a more 
comprehensive and well-rounded policy is required to fix a problem like the one 
South Africa is facing with high unemployment.  
5.5 Other strategies to overcome youth unemployment crises 
The examples discussed so far in this chapter generally comprise some form 
of subsidy provided by a government (whether to employers or to facilitate skills 
training) to try and facilitate the combatting of youth (or general) unemployment.  
An employer or employee subsidy is not the only way to tackle this type of socio-
economic problem, however.  In what follows, I will very briefly discuss examples 
of labour strategies or programmes, other than wage subsidies, that have been 
194 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
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implemented by the governments of Brazil, Indonesia and India respectively, in 
order to attempt to overcome youth unemployment problems.195 
5.5.1 Brazil – social welfare approach 
Despite generally low levels of unemployment (recorded at 5% in March 
2014 196 ), Brazil also faces some problems with youth unemployment.  In 
particular, it faces a problem with youths entering into the workforce at a too early 
age.  Due to the market climate and relatively high levels of poverty amongst a 
large portion of the population, youths are often left with no option but to leave 
school at an early age to start earning an income, even before they have finished 
secondary or tertiary education and have gained the employable skills necessary 
for long-term success.  This premature entry limits these youths’ ability to, firstly, 
find a good and well-paying job in the formal sector and, secondly, their ability to 
progress in their careers.  Ultimately, it limits their ability to have a good, 
sustainable quality of life.   
In 2009, it was estimated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics that almost 65% of Brazilian youths entered the labour force between the 
ages of 10 and 17, with more than 90% doing so before the age of 20.197  The 
Brazilian government had to address this issue by delaying the entry of youths into 
the labour market to ensure that when they eventually did so, these youths were in 
a position to do so in a manner which would ensure long-term prosperity.  The 
solution comprised several social welfare policies that were put into place, aimed 
at reducing inequality, raising wages for low-income earners and strengthening 
healthcare and education systems.198  The social components being addressed were 
thus much wider than in the case of the employer-side wage subsidy that is the 
focus of ETIA.  By 2013, these social welfare measures in Brazil had the effect that 
less than 25% of youths between the ages of 15 and 17 had a job, whilst more than 
195 The examples and accompanying content that follows were all taken from a report released by JustJobs 
network (www.justjobsnetwork.org) which was released in October 2014 and tiled ‘Overcoming the Youth 
Employment Crisis: Strategies from Around the Globe (Gregory Randolph).  The report can be found at: 
(www.justjobsnetwork.org/wp-
content/pubs/reports/Overcoming%20the%20Youth%20Employment%20Crisis.pdf) 
196 Ibid 195 at page 23 
197 Ibid 195 at page 24 
198 Ibid 195 at page 25 
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85% were still in school, furthering their education.  A third of youths between the 
ages of 18 and 24 were still studying.199 
By addressing a broader range of social aspects, the Brazilian government 
ensured a change to youths’ general environment - enabling them to have more 
and better employment options.  This example offers evidence of how important it 
is to understand the reasons for certain social phenomena, as well as of the 
successful impact a multi-faceted intervention may have. 
5.5.2 Belu district, Indonesia – entrepreneurship 
Youth unemployment in Indonesia exceeds 20%.200  
Entrepreneurship is often presented as a potential panacea for the global 
youth employment crisis.  In a country like Indonesia, where the informal sector 
employs 60% of the workforce, entrepreneurship becomes even more vital to 
economic growth and job creation.201  Entrepreneurship is also often labelled as an 
‘easy’ route to develop an economy and at the same time it creates a lot of informal 
jobs, whilst it requires very little government intervention and regulation – thus 
making it an ideal solution for a country with limited state capacity, like Indonesia.   
To address its unemployment issues, and considering the sharp decline in 
job-creation coming from the manufacturing sector, the Indonesian government 
introduced a National Entrepreneurship Movement, seeking to reduce youth 
unemployment by combining a series of training and micro-finance programs.202   
In 2009, a law was passed which outlined a plan for the national and the 
local governments, together with youth organisations and communities, to foster 
entrepreneurship through training, internships, coaching, partnerships, and 
promotion and access to capital.203  These programmes were introduced and 
monitored by region or district and the results have been mixed.   
199 Ibid 195 at page 29 
200 Ibid 195 at page 76 
201 Ibid 195 at page 78 
202 Ibid 195 at page 82 
203 Ibid 195 at page 83 
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A recent case study on the Belu District program204 identified the following 
aspects relating to the entrepreneurship program that required to be addressed in 
order to ensure success205: 
a) the necessity for strong, co-ordinated government institutions to
ensure effective implementation, despite the belief that
entrepreneurship could stimulate job creation where state capacity is
weak;
b) the fact that entrepreneurship policies will only be successful as part
of a larger, enabling framework - i.e. skills training and the
availability of start-up capital fostering a successful, overall
entrepreneurship strategy and creating an ecosystem of
complementary interventions;
c) that governmental and private organisational support during the
initial start-up phase of an entrepreneurial business is vital to its
eventual successes; and
d) that it requires policymakers to have a better understanding of youth
aspirations, i.e. by identifying young people who do have the desire
to own their own businesses.
5.5.3 India -  social skills training 
More than 60% of India’s population is below 35 years of age206 – a 
distinctive demographic advantage for the future prosperity of the country. 
Unemployment amongst the youth is growing, however, especially among the 
literate, with almost one in every three urban males who have graduated from 
school or secondary education finding themselves without a job.207  The most 
significant source of the problem seems to be an out-dated education system that 
is mismatched with current labour demands.208  Effectively, and despite being 
sufficiently academically qualified to find jobs in the formal sector, many of India’s 
204 Ibid 192 at page 84 
205 Ibid 192 at page 88 – 89 
206 Ibid 192 at page 51 
207 Ibid 192 at page 51 
208 Ibid 192 at page 52 
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youths lack the necessary “soft” skills to achieve success in the current labour 
environment. 
The Indian government recognised this problem and, with assistance from 
the private sector, a National Skill Development Corporation was established, with 
the aim of providing certain skills training to youths in accordance with industry-
requirements and in order to place them in appropriate jobs, thus attempting to 
ensure long-term successes.209  To date, these training programmes have not 
shown significant success, with many of the youths who graduate from these 
programs failing to stay in their new jobs. Such failures make it clear that 
vulnerable youths require long-term support networks to improve employment 
outcomes for them.   
The Indian example also underlines the importance of a comprehensive, 
multi-pronged approached to ensure success in overcoming these types of social 
issues.   
5.6 Conclusion 
There is more than one way to solve a problem, and in the context of solving 
unemployment issues, governments have historically found it somewhat difficult.  
This chapter outlined a few of the many different approaches governments have 
decided to adopt, with or without success, to attempt to solve youth unemployment 
problems.  In the following, final chapter I will provide concluding remarks on the 
ETIA and its potential to succeed.  I will also suggest some alternative solutions to 
South Africa’s unemployment problems. 
209 Ibid 192 at page 51 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters of this study, I: 
a) provided brief insights into the historical use of wage subsidies to
counter youth unemployment internationally (see chapter 2);
b) discussed up-to-date statistics regarding the youth unemployment
crisis in South Africa (see chapter 3);
c) carried out a detailed analysis of the ETIA and its foremost
provisions (see chapter 4); and
d) conducted a number of comparative studies by juxtaposing the
ETIA and its provisions against counter-unemployment measures
(including, most importantly, wage subsidies) used in other
countries (see chapter 5).
This final chapter is dedicated to concluding remarks.   
To start off with, I will provide insights into recommendations taken 
from in-depth studies by influential international bodies and organisations, 
including the World Bank and the OECD 210  regarding international 
programmes, including the ETIA, used to counter youth unemployment.  I 
intend to use these insights to point out where, in my view, the ETIA should fit 
into the South African government’s greater, more comprehensive plan to 
counter youth unemployment.   Clearly, on its own, the ETIA will enjoy little or 
no success and needs to be part of a ‘greater’ plan.    
Thereafter, and in conclusion of this paper, I will put forward some 
personal views on the ETIA, the likelihood of it being a successful ‘job creation 
210 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or “OECD” is an international 
organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance challenges of a globalised 
economy, see: (http://www.oecd.org) 
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mechanism’ and some of the aspects that could potentially be detrimental to 
its success.  
6.2 International recommendations 
6.2.1 World Bank211 
In a study published by the World Bank in September 2012, entitled 
‘Youth Employment Programmes: An evaluation of World Bank and IFC 
Support’212, the following was noted: 
“Youth employment issues are a major concern for many countries 
because they have negative effects on the welfare of young people, and may 
also adversely affect economic performance and social stability. (…) 
Youth employment is a multi-sectoral issue, but few youth employment 
projects are implemented by multi-sectoral teams.  Evidence on what works 
in youth employment is scarce.  Known factors that contribute to success are 
a comprehensive approach including participation of the private sector, 
monitoring and follow up of individual participants, and complementary 
interventions, such as a combined training with job search and placement 
assistance, rather than isolated interventions.  In high-unemployment 
environments, wage subsidies, skills training and job search support are of 
little impact; and demand-side interventions are needed. (…) 
 The international literature on youth employment programs suggests a 
comprehensive approach works best.  A “comprehensive approach” is a 
multi-pronged strategy that includes complementary interventions aimed at 
removing key constraints to youth employment across multiple elements of 
the youth employment spectrum, namely: influencing the job creation and 
work opportunities for youth, labour markets characteristics and labour 
supply.”  
(Own emphasis) 
211 The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans to developing countries for 
capital programmes – See (http://www.worldbank.org)  
212 See: (http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-9794-7) at pages XI and XV (Overview) 
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6.2.2 JustJobs Network213 
A report published by JustJobsnetwork214, with assistance from the 
Development Policy Research Unit of South Africa215, draws the following 
conclusions regarding the ETIA: 
“The ETIA is an important measure to curb high youth unemployment 
in the short run, and it is likely that the program will open doors for young 
people to enter the labor market and become more employable.  However, it 
is by no means a panacea to South Africa’s youth entering the labor market. 
The ETI must be linked to strategies that include the up-skilling of South 
Africa’s youth, growing small businesses and promoting labor-intensive 
sectors if it is to have the desired impact of improving youth employment 
outcomes in the long term. 
To this end, policymakers should increase awareness of the scheme 
among small businesses and ensure that the cost-benefit analysis for these 
enterprises is in favour of participation.  Most importantly, South Africa 
must explore ways to link the subsidy with skill development more directly – 
for instance, by offering a skilling component to program participants 
aligned with their occupation.” 
(Own emphasis) 
6.2.3 The OECD216 
As part of its 2013 Economic Surveys217, the OECD had the following 
comments regarding South Africa’s youth unemployment issues and measures 
that have been put in place to combat these: 
213 Ibid 195 and (www.justjobsnetwork.org) 
214 ‘Overcoming the youth employment crisis: Strategies from around the world’, at: 
(www.justjobsnetwork.org/wp-
content/pubs/reports/Overcoming%20the%20Youth%20Employment%20Crisis.pdf) - page 70. 
215 The Development Policy Research Unit is an institutionally recognised research unit located within the 
School of Economics at the University of Cape Town.  
216 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or “OECD” is an international 
organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance challenges of a globalised 
economy, see: (http://www.oecd.org) 
217 See: (http://oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-south-africa-2013/executive-
summary_eco_surveys-zaf-2013-2-en) at page 8. 
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“South Africa is advancing, but is failing to fully achieve its 
considerable potential. (…) 
Education is a critical problem.  Skill mismatches represent one aspect 
of the persistently high unemployment rate, especially for the youth: the 
education system is not producing the skills needed in the labour market. 
Returns on a high-school certificate, both in terms of finding a job and the 
earnings premium when employed, are mediocre, while the shortage of 
skilled workers is reflected in a high premium for university graduates.   
If South Africa is to achieve full employment, the quality of basic and 
vocational education has to be improved.” 
(Own emphasis) 
6.2.4 The ETIA: An isolated intervention, or not? 
Earlier in this paper (see 1.2 and 3.1), I briefly alluded to the ETIA as the 
fruition of government’s plan to ‘offer a tax incentive to reduce the cost of 
hiring young labour market entrants’.  I also noted that this incentive forms 
part of a greater, national initiative, known as the National Development Plan 
2030218 (‘NDP’) - published on 15 August 2012.  The NDP is a long-term South 
African development plan, developed by the National Planning Commission in 
collaboration and consultation with South Africans from all walks of life.219  As 
one of the 13 action points under chapter 3 of the Summary, Objectives and 
Actions of the NDP220, entitled ‘Economy and Employment’, the need for such 
a tax incentive was confirmed.  This need was satisfied by the enactment of the 
ETIA, effective from 1 January 2014.   
This is a tax paper (or analysis), not a socio-economic one.  I therefore do 
not intend to analyse the NDP in any detail, save to say that, from the contents 
thereof, it is evident that the ETIA is not an isolated intervention attempting to 
combat high youth unemployment, as many may have feared.  On the contrary, 
218 See: (www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030) 




it forms part of a more comprehensive plan to overhaul the South African 
economic environment that has been (or will be) put in place to achieve certain 
goals – including to increase general employment.  Whether the other 
measures that government intends to put in place in terms of the NDP will 
indeed become reality remains to be seen.  Questions regarding these 
measures and their complementary interaction with the ETIA also remain 
unanswered (see below and 6.3 for personal comments regarding the timing of 
the ETIA).  It does seem, however, that the ETIA is not an isolated attempt to 
solve the problem. 
A particular point of concern regarding the ETIA as part of the NDP is 
its timing and also the fact that it will only be effective until the last day of 
December 2016 (see ‘Sunset’ clause – 4.3.9).  It does not seem to be advisable, 
in my view, for such an incentive have such a short lifespan if the greater 
initiative that it forms part of will continue until 2030.  Of further concern is 
the fact that the incentive, aimed at the demand-side of the labour market, is 
enacted before the supply-side issues, such as poor basic education and skills 
shortages, are addressed.   
It will be interesting to see if the government decides to extend the 
duration of the ETIA beyond the initial ‘sunset’ date in 2016.  Not to do so, 
would not be advisable, in my view. 
6.3 Personal views 
Throughout the course of this paper I have provided chapter (or topic) specific 
personal views.  At the end of chapter 4, I addressed some of the common concerns 
raised by stakeholders regarding the ETIA and made some of my own comments 
on these and therefore do not intend to do so again in this chapter.   
As a tax act, the ETIA has a specific goal and, in my view, it was drafted in a 
plain, concise and understandable manner to achieve this.  Ultimately, the aim 
remains simple: to encourage ‘eligible employers’ to make use of a governmental 
wage subsidy by hiring ‘qualifying employees’ at a reduced cost.  By doing so, 
previously unemployed young people would be introduced into the job-market for 
the first time.  In general, the plain language of the ETIA is uncomplicated and, if 
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the surrounding circumstances are amenable to it, it should achieve its conceptual 
goals (see for example 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 for examples of such goals).   
All that remains to be addressed is whether, in my view, the ETIA will be 
successful in actually achieving its goal of reducing or combatting youth 
unemployment.   
My opinion is that it will not, and my reasons are the following: 
1. ‘Jumping the gun’ – poor basic education and a lack of skills: To my mind,
the biggest flaw of the ETIA is that it does not address much bigger,
fundamental issues in South Africa’s employee market.  It was enacted
prematurely and before these fundamental issues received attention.  The
foremost of these fundamental issues is the fact that a greater portion of the
unemployed youths, who are the ‘target group’ of the ETIA, are
unemployable due to having little or no form of basic education.  It is, of
course, easy to sit on the side and criticise, but in my view the improvement
of our education system should be the first priority at this point in time and
deserves more attention and funding than what it is receiving at the
moment.
2. Practicality of using the PAYE system:  As mentioned earlier in chapter 4,
employers need to be registered under the PAYE system in order to qualify
for the incentive under the ETIA.  This poses some practical challenges and
seems to automatically exclude some of the employers that the ETIA is
actually aimed at.  To my mind, the types of employers that will benefit from
the incentive under the ETIA are small to medium-sized enterprises.  These
types of enterprises do not always have the infrastructure and resources to
register and process monthly PAYE filings and payments, possibly
rendering them ineligible to qualify as ‘eligible employers’ under the ETIA.
In my view, this requirement should be revisited.
3. A lack of compulsory skills training: In contrast to the two Projecto Joven’s
in Argentina and Chile (see 5.3), the ETIA does not include a compulsory
skills training component.  The Minister of Finance does have prerogative to
issue regulations to make on-the-job training mandatory under the ETIA,
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but nothing has been forthcoming thus far.  The fact that the ETIA has a 
lifespan of only three years (initially) also raises some concerns about the 
extent of actual skills development of qualifying employees during the 
period of their ‘employment’ under the ETIA.  It also begs the question 
whether this omission would not entice some employers to merely hire 
employees to make use of the incentive, leaving employees jobless (once 
again) and still unskilled, at the end of 2016.  From a long-term point of 
view, this aspect needs to be addressed to make it ‘worthwhile’ for 
employees and to ensure a general upskilling of the youth employee-pool in 
South Africa. 
4. Duration of the incentive under the ETIA:  This concern may be addressed
during 2016 and government may decide to extend the effective period of
the ETIA beyond 31 December 2016.  Should they not, the incentive will
prove to be of little value.  South Africa needs a period of sustained
employment of previously unemployed youths, i.e. for those youths to keep
their jobs for a prolonged period of time to develop skills, build confidence,
strengthen personal financial positions, etc.  By removing this incentive
within three years of its enactment, the Legislature will render those
employed under the auspices of the ETIA once again unemployed and with
little more to show for themselves than before.
5. Incongruent business-, corporate- and employment laws and access to
business financing:  As the World Bank and JustJobs network stated (see
6.2.1 and 6.2.2), youth unemployment in South Africa requires a
comprehensive strategy that includes several complementary interventions,
in order for the issue to be addressed adequately.  South Africa is not
renowned for being a particularly easy place to do business in, in
comparison to other parts of the world.  If our youth employment market is
to benefit fully from an incentive such as the ETIA, other facets of ‘doing
business’ also need to be addressed.  As mentioned herein before, small to
medium-sized enterprises are the lifeblood of our economy’s future and
consequently should be the most prominent exponents or users of the
incentive under the ETIA.
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Big corporates will never be the main contributors to the success of ETIA in 
curbing unemployment as these institutions generally require skilled and 
experienced employees.  The incentive under the ETIA is also financially too 
insignificant to be of any benefit to such corporates.  Small to medium-sized 
enterprises may, however, make use of this more frequently as they will 
obtain a proportionally bigger benefit.  Government therefore needs to 
ensure that it is easier and more sustainable for entrepreneurs to set up and 
operate such businesses. 
6. A lack of awareness: As noted above, small to medium-sized enterprises
need to be the most prominent users of the ETIA for it to be a successful
counter-unemployment measure. It seems, however, that many
entrepreneurs that own such enterprises are unaware of the ETIA and
therefore have not enrolled and do not exploit the benefits available
thereunder.221  Government should do more to promote the ETIA and
should also provide public consultancy services to educate business owners
more in this regard.
Although a lot more can be said about the ETIA, I believe that the above 
adequately summarises my understanding of and views on this ‘new’ piece of 
legislation.  There is room for improvement and several aspects require addressing 
if one takes a holistic view on youth unemployment issues and the potential 
impacts of the ETIA.  It remains to be seen whether government will do the 
necessary to meaningfully address the concerns that have been identified above 
over the next few years. 
[23,200 words - Chapters 1 to 6, excluding footnotes] 
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